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This Article provides a comprehensive-though admittedly speculative-
explanation of how jurors use projection and prototyping, two simulation-based
theories of mindreading, to make mental-state attributions in criminal cases. The
first two Parts explain why jurors are unlikely to use a functionalist method of
mindreading in a case that focuses on the defendant's mens rea. The next three
Parts introduce projection and prototyping, describe the evidence that jurors
actually use them to make mental-state determinations, and discuss the cognitive
mechanism-perceived similarity between juror and defendant-that determines
which one a juror will use in a particular case. Th6 final two Parts explain why
projection and prototyping are likely to result in inaccurate mental-state
determinations and discuss debiasing techniques that may make them more
accurate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea-"the act does not make a
person guilty unless the mind is also guilty."' Few today would disagree
with the maxim; the criminal law has long since rejected the idea that
causing harm should be criminal regardless of the defendant's subjective
culpability.2 Still, the maxim begs a critical question: can jurors accurately
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I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4, at 225 (4th ed. 2003).
2 See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of
Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 635, 642-43
("[C]ommentators generally agree that no systematic mens rea requirements existed until at
least the early thirteenth century. Indeed, prior to that time it appears the law was essentially
grounded in strict liability.").
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determine whether the defendant acted with the requisite "guilty mind"? St.
Thomas Aquinas was certainly skeptical that such mindreading-as
cognitive psychologists call it3-is within the ken of mere mortals:
[Mlan, the framer of human law, is able to judge only of outward acts; because
man seeth those things that appear, according to 1 Kings 16.7; but God alone, the
framer of the Divine law, is able to judge the inward movement of wills ....
4
Given the significant cognitive demands contemporary criminal law
imposes on jurors, Aquinas's skepticism seems more prescient than ever.
The common law, for example, not only asks jurors to distinguish between
seventy-eight different terms for mental states,5 it fails to define the various
mental states consistently-there are seven different definitions of willful
alone 6-and combines them in permutations that defy comprehension.
Indeed, the common law is such a mess that no less an authority than
Justice Robert Jackson once bemoaned the "variety, disparity, and
confusion" of the "requisite but elusive mental element."'
The Model Penal Code (MPC), adopted by a majority of states,9 may
actually be worse. To be sure, the MPC takes a far more systematic
approach to mens rea, winnowing the common law's seventy-eight mental
states to four: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.10 Those
mental states are differentiated with such "subtlety and precision," however,
that it is an open question whether jurors can accurately distinguish them. l"
3 See Alvin Goldman & Kelby Mason, Simulation, in HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE: PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE 267, 267 (Paul Thagard ed.,
2006).
4 II ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD, second part, part 1, question 100, art. 9, at 261 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed.,
founders ed. 1952). Modem legal scholars have expressed similar skepticism. See, e.g.,
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 33 (1968) (noting that although "[i]t is
relatively simple to show that an agent lacked ... volitional muscular control[,] it is
somewhat more difficult to show that he did not know certain facts about either present
circumstances ... or the future" and "much more difficult to establish whether or not a
person was deprived of 'self-control' by passion provoked by others, or by partial mental
disease").
5 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 692 n.48 (1983).
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal
Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2000) (noting that common-law criminal codes "frequently
use confusing, convoluted, or arcane language in setting out offenses"). Rhode Island, for
example, defines murder as a "willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing." R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
8 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 230 (1985).
9 See Robinson & Grall, supra note 5, at 691-92.
10 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2).
11 Rebecca Dresser, Culpability and Other Minds, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 41, 48
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Consider, for example, the MPC's three subjective mental states: a person
acts "purposely" if his "conscious object" is to bring about a particular
result; 12 acts "knowingly" if he is "aware that it is practically certain" that
his conduct will lead to the result;1 3 and acts "recklessly" if he "consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his conduct will cause
the result. 14 Those are fine distinctions, to say the least. Little wonder,
then, that scholars have described the MPC as an "elaborate set of precise
rules whose operability depends on the jury's willingness"-to say nothingof t eir • • ,,15
of their ability- "to make artificial characterizations.
The MPC's idiosyncratic definition of negligence only further
complicates mindreading. Negligence is defined as the defendant acting
"when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his
conduct will lead to a particular result.1 6 Common law negligence is not
actually a mental state; the reasonable-person standard "is determined and
applied without reference to what the actor was thinking at the moment.,
17
The MPC, by contrast, subjectivizes negligence, once again requiring jurors
to read the defendant's mind: whether the defendant's conduct was
unreasonable must be determined "considering the. nature and purpose of
his conduct and the circumstances known to him" at the time of the crime.
1 8
Nor is that all. Although the common law at least limited each offense
to a single mental state,1 9 the MPC permits different mental states to apply
to different material elements of an offense-what is known as "element
analysis. 2 °  Misdemeanor indecent exposure is an example: "A person
commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual
desire ... he exposes his genitals under circumstances in which he knows
his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm., 21 Thus defined, a jury must
(1993).
12 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(a).
13 Id. § 2.02(2)(b).
14 Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
15 Harold Edgar, Mens Rea, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1028, 1039
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (asserting that the Model Penal Code's (MPC) mental states
are "artificial characterizations" and questioning whether they are "provable occurrences").
16 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(d).
17 See, e.g., Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L.
REv. 2071, 2075 n.24 (1994) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 173-74 (5th ed. 1984)).
18 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(d). This injection of subjectivity
into an otherwise objective test is typical of the Model Penal Code. As Gardner has pointed
out, the MPC's "preference for subjective culpability is manifested throughout the
substantive provisions of the Code." Gardner, supra note 2, at 684.
19 Robinson & Grall, supra note 5, at 683.
20 Id. at 703.
21 Id. at 699 (citation omitted).
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determine both whether the defendant acted knowingly (with regard to his
conduct's potential to cause affront or alarm) and whether he acted
purposely (with regard to arousing or gratifying sexual desire)-a far more
complicated mindreading task than determining a single mental state.
This discussion also assumes that jurors normally determine whether
the defendant is guilty of a single crime. In many cases, of course, jurors
will have to choose between multiple closely-related crimes, whether
because the prosecution has charged them in the alternative or because they
are added in jury instructions as lesser-included offenses. Jurors in a
homicide case, for example, may be asked to determine whether the
defendant is guilty of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, reckless
homicide, or criminally negligent homicide. Those charges are normally
distinguished solely by the mental state they require: a "premeditated and
intentional" killing for first-degree murder; 22 a "knowing" killing for
second-degree murder;23 a "reckless" killing for reckless homicide; 24 and
"criminally negligent conduct" that results in death for criminally negligent
homicide.25
Finally, in most criminal cases, jurors will have to deal with yet
another mental state: namely, the one associated with the defense the
defendant uses to negate the mens rea of the charged crime.26 A defendant
may defend himself against a murder charge, for example, by alleging that
he was legally insane at the time of the killing.27 Most often, as in the
murder example, the focus will be on the defendant's lack of a "guilty
mind." In some cases, however, the defendant may invoke a defense that
shifts attention to the victim's mental state at the time of the crime-a rape
case, for example, in which the defendant claims that the victim consented
to the sex.
It is fair to say, in short, that contemporary criminal law requires jurors
to be latter-day Kreskins-to not only reliably distinguish nearly-
indistinguishable mental states, but also to accurately determine which of
many possible mental states the defendant actually possessed at the time of
22 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(1) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
23 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(1) (2006).
24 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-215(a) (2006).
25 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-212(a) (2006).
26 See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 11, at 51 ("[Mlany criminal defenses require mental state
determinations. Duress, self-defense, intoxication, insanity, and diminished capacity are
examples.").
27 See, e.g., JENNY McEWAN, THE VERDICT OF THE COURT 75 (2003) ("[T]he underlying
principle of the insanity defense.., amounts to a denial of mens rea.").
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the crime.28 Is such mindreading possible? Or is Aquinas correct that "God
alone.., is able to judge the inward movement of wills"?
Given the centrality of mens rea to criminal responsibility, we would
expect legal scholars to have provided a persuasive answer to this question.
Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the truth. Most scholars
simply presume that jurors can mindread accurately, and those that take
mindreading seriously have uniformly adopted "common sense
functionalism," 29 a theory of mental-state attribution that is contradicted by
a vast amount of research into the cognitive psychology of mindreading.
Common-sense functionalism assumes that a juror can accurately determine
a defendant's mental state through common-sense generalizations about
how external circumstances, mental states, and physical behavior are
causally related. 30  Research indicates, however, that mindreading is
actually a simulation-based, not theory-based, process. When a juror
perceives the defendant to be similar to himself, he will mindread through
"projection," attributing to the defendant the mental state that he would
have had in the defendant's situation. And when the juror perceives the
defendant to be dissimilar to himself, he will mindread through
"prototyping," inferring the defendant's mental state from the degree of
correspondence between the defendant's act and his pre-existing conception
of what the "typical" crime or defense of that type looks like.
The goal of this Article is to provide a comprehensive-though
admittedly speculative--explanation of how jurors use projection and
prototyping to make mental-state attributions in criminal cases. The Article
is divided into six Parts. The first two provide the necessary background:
Part II sketches the traditional functionalist explanation of mindreading, and
Part III explains why jurors are unlikely to use a functionalist method in a
case that focuses on the defendant's mens rea. The next two Parts are
descriptive: Part IV introduces projection and prototyping and discusses the
evidence that jurors use them to make mental-state determinations, while
Part V explains the cognitive mechanism-perceived similarity between
juror and defendant-that determines which technique a juror will use in a
28 See, e.g., NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE 61-62 (1995) ("We place a great
burden on jurors .... [W]e ask jurors to comprehend the act, infer the intent, and reach a
judgment about culpability and blameworthiness. Particularly in terms of fathoming intent,
jurors must plunge from the hazy facts into a defendant's mind, where a darkness that eludes
even videotapes reigns."); Dresser, supra note 11, at 48 ("With the current law's increased
emphasis on subjective culpability, other minds judgments have become more imperative,
because the legitimacy of the subjective approach absolutely depends on our ability to
determine whether defendants possessed the requisite state of awareness when the criminal
activity occurred.").
29 Goldman & Mason, supra note 3, at 269.
30 See infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
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particular case. The final two Parts are then analytic: Part VI explains why
projection and prototyping are likely to result in inaccurate mental-state
determinations, and Part VII discusses de-biasing techniques that could be
used to improve their accuracy.
II. THE TRADITIONAL EXPLANATION
Rebecca Dresser has argued that "the general legal reaction to the
proof issues raised by other minds judgments is either to ignore or to
dismiss them. 31  It is difficult to disagree. Aside from Dresser's own
article and an article by Adam Candeub,32 one searches the legal literature
in vain for a sustained discussion of the psychology of juror mindreading.
Most scholars, it appears, simply presume that accurate mindreading is
possible-a position that dates back at least to 1882, when Bowen famously
dismissed Oliver Wendell Holmes's skepticism toward mindreading 33 by
claiming that "the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion." 34 Little has changed in the intervening century. In fact, as
recently as 1987, Richard Singer could assert without argument that "[i]t is
certainly within the jury's ken to find that a typical self defender did not
intend (purpose) a killing."35
The question, of course, is why legal scholars take it for granted that
jurors can make accurate mental-state determinations. As discussed
above,36 given the significant cognitive demands that contemporary
criminal law imposes on jurors, it is far from obvious that they can. The
answer seems to be that legal scholars embrace, implicitly or explicitly, a
commonsense theory of mental-state attribution in which mindreading
seems neither particularly complicated nor particularly problematic.
That theory relies on three interrelated assumptions. The first is that
there are fixed and unchanging causal relationships between external
circumstances, internal mental states, and physical behavior. Jerome Hall's
response to Holmes-echoing Bowen-is illustrative:
[T]he inevitable limitations on our knowledge do not support the conclusion that, in
the vast majority of judgments based on rational methods of investigation, there is no
31 Dresser, supra note 11, at 61.
32 See generally Candeub, supra note 17.
33 See Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: 1, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 753,
769 (1943) (noting that Holmes "saw fit to take the road of rather extreme skepticism,
because he apparently believed that there must be a great disparity between conclusion of
fact based on external conduct and actual inner states").
34 Id. at 767 (citation omitted).
35 Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: Il-Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of
Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 515 (1987).
36 See supra notes 6-28 and accompanying text.
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reasonably accurate correspondence. The whole law of evidence is a studied effort to
cope with this fundamental problem and its justification rests on the high probability
of a "sufficiently" accurate representation of inner states by external conduct. This
premise is accepted not only in law, but throughout every avenue of social life. It
rests ultimately on the essential uniformity of human nature, and is so deeply
ingrained in our daily experience that it is hardly possible even to conceive of social37
intercourse founded on its rejection.
The second assumption, dependent on the first, is that jurors possess an
intuitive theory of the specific causal relationships that exist between
circumstances, mental states, and behavior. Wigmore divides those
relationships-what H.L.A. Hart calls "common-sense generalizations
about human nature" 38-into two basic categories: (1) "circumstances
tending to excite, stimulate, or bring the emotion in question into play"; and
(2) "outward conduct expressing and resulting from the emotion in
question." 39 Hart's insistence "that men are capable of self-control when
confronted with an open till but not when confronted with a wife in
adultery '4 and Oliver Wendell Holmes's belief that "[d]etached reflection
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife'" 1 are examples of
commonsense generalizations in the first category. Rex v. Shaw's assertion
that strangling someone to death with a rope indicates malice aforethought
42
is an example of a commonsense generalization in the second category.
As the examples indicate, both categories of generalizations take a common
"if x, then y" form, where x is the circumstances or behavior and y is the
mental state that can be inferred from them.4 3
The third and final assumption then flows naturally from the second:
jurors determine a defendant's mental state by applying their commonsense
theory of the specific relationships that exist between circumstances, mental
states, and behavior to the evidence in the case. Hall makes that point
explicitly in his discussion of how fact-finders rely on "the essential
37 Hall, supra note 33, at 770-71.
38 HART, supra note 4, at 33.
39 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 387, at 416 (1979).
40 HART, supra note 4, at 33.
41 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
42 (1834) 172 Eng. Rep. 1282 (N.P.); see also Luke Wilson, Renaissance ToolAbuse and
the Legal History of the Sudden, in LITERATURE, POLITICS, AND LAW IN RENAISSANCE
ENGLAND 121, 128-39 (Erica Sheen & Lorna Hutson eds., 2005) (noting that courts in the
Renaissance era tended to infer lack of premeditation from "tool abuse"-killing with an
object that was not designed to serve as a weapon).
43 Philosophers and cognitive psychologists who adopt functionalist theories tend to rely
on more sophisticated and less concrete generalizations, such as "[i]f someone wants x, and
believes that y is a means to x, then, other things being equal, they will do y." Goldman &
Mason, supra note 3, at 268. The basic idea, however, is the same.
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uniformity of human nature" to determine what kinds of behavior indicate
that a defendant acted "intentionally":
[H]uman conduct that is associated causally with certain harms proscribed by law,
is labelled [sic] "intentional' by triers of the material facts on the basis of knowledge
of certain external data .... Given certain facts, we must conclude that any and every
rational human being in those circumstances did or did not intend the results .... 44
Judge Posner offers a more specific example of this reasoning
process-what he calls, somewhat idiosyncratically, a "behaviorist account
of deliberation" 45-when he discusses how jurors infer premeditation from
the evidence in a case:
[I]n deciding whether a crime is premeditated ... we examine the circumstances of
the crime: Was it concealed? Had the criminal made arrangements for a getaway?
Had he obtained the means of committing the crime in advance? Were those means
suitable to the end (suitably lethal, in the case of a murder)? Did the criminal have
much to gain from the crime? From these circumstances a model of a deliberating
criminal could be constructed-an "objective" reconstruction of the criminal's
motivational experience, created by attributing to him a certain type of rationality.
46
Taken together, these three assumptions constitute what cognitive
psychologists have described as a functionalist account of mindreading.47
We can summarize that account as follows:
[O]ur mindreading capacity is implemented by an intuitive theory of mind, a body
of knowledge or belief about the causal relations between mental states on the one
hand and behavior, environment and other mental states on the other .... In
mindreading, we use these generalizations and our data about the target's
circumstances or behavior to infer some of the target's mental states.
4 8
Two additional aspects of functionalist theorizing are worth noting.
First, the theory assumes that jurors acquire their "intuitive theory of mind"
in a manner that approximates the scientific method: via "a gradual process
of theorizing, making generalizations based on the available evidence,
revising.., theories to handle incongruent evidence, etc. ' 49 The process, in
other words, is empirical,50 grounded in jurors' real-world observation of
44 Hall, supra note 33, at 767; see also GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART 91 (2d ed. 1961) (arguing that "[iut is platitudinous to say that intent must
frequently be gathered from conduct on the basis of a supposed uniformity of human
nature").
45 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 175 (1990).
46 id.
47 Goldman & Mason, supra note 3, at 269.
41 Id. at 286-89.
49 Id. at 270.
50 ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, SIMULATING MINDS 26 (2006); cf WIGMORE, supra note 39,
§ 394, at 437 ("Drawing inferences from. . . conduct always proceeds from experience.").
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causal relationships between external circumstances and mental states and
between mental states and physical behavior.5'
Second, as conceptualized by functionalist theorizing, mindreading
does not involve any kind of introspection on the part of the juror-the
juror mindreads by applying his commonsense generalizations to the
evidence in the defendant's case; he does not ask what mental state he
would have had in the defendant's situation.52 The distinction is a fine one:
given that the juror's generalizations are ostensibly based on the
psychology of "any and every rational human being," they should apply no
less to him than to others. Nevertheless, although theorizing and
introspection may well lead a juror to attribute the same mental state to the
defendant, the processes they employ are completely different:
functionalism views mindreading as the application of a theory, not as an
exercise in phenomenology.
Il1. PROBLEMS WITH THE TRADITIONAL EXPLANATION
There is no question that functionalist theorizing provides an
intuitively plausible explanation of how jurors mindread.53 Jurors do not
have direct access to the defendant's mind, but they do know what the
defendant's physical behavior was-the crime itself, the actus reus-and
have at least some sense of what the external circumstances were that led to
that behavior. It thus seems eminently sensible to assume that a juror
would infer the "missing" mental state from the evidence by relying on an
intuitive theory of how circumstances, mental states, and behavior are
causally related.
For a number of reasons, however, projection and prototyping provide
a far better account of how jurors make mental-state determinations than
functionalist theorizing. To begin with, research indicates that the "default
starting point, 54 of mindreading is projection or prototyping, not
functionalist theorizing. In terms of prototyping, for example, Fiske and
Neuberg have found that "[p]erceivers attempt category-based impression
51 See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 11, at 75 ("Like other empirical generalizations, it is
justified by our prior observation of a consistent connection between two phenomena-the
external signs and the mental states they represent.").
52 See GOLDMAN, supra note 50, at 40 ("Under the [functionalist] account, the mind-
reader never ascribes one of her own decisions to the target; no such decision is part of the
theorizing routine. In the theorizing routine, all states of the mind-reader are (third-person)
metarepresentations-that is, beliefs about mental states of the target.").
53 See Dresser, supra note 11, at 75 ("[T]his theory identifies mental states according to a
process that sounds very much like what goes on in courtrooms every day.").
54 Daniel R. Ames, Everyday Solutions to the Problem of Other Minds, in OTHER MINDS:
How HUMANS BRIDGE THE DIVIDE BETWEEN SELF AND OTHERS 158, 166 (Bertram F. Malle
& Sara D. Hodges eds., 2005).
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formation before they use more attribute-oriented impression formation,
and if relatively category-oriented processes are successful, then the
perceiver goes no further toward more attribute-oriented processes.
55
Similarly, in terms of projection, Krueger has shown that "[w]hen the
responses of others are not known, people project their own as a first bet.,
56
Krueger's conclusion indicates, of course, that jurors may shift from
projection to functionalist theorizing if the "responses of others" are
known. Indeed, Ames argues that, in general, "[c]umulative behavioral
evidence supercedes extra-target strategies: [p]rojection and stereotyping
will drive mindreading when behavioral evidence is ambiguous, but as
apparent evidence accumulates, inductive judgments will dominate. 57 That
makes sense-if a mindreading target's behavior is unambiguous because
we know how the target normally reacts to certain situations or because one
and only one mental state is consistent with the behavioral evidence, there
is no reason to disregard that knowledge in favor of "extra-target strategies"
like projection and prototyping.
Few criminal cases that focus on mens rea, however, will provide
jurors with sufficiently unambiguous behavioral evidence. First, voir dire
will ensure that the defendant is a stranger to the jurors,58 while the
character evidence rule will normally prevent the prosecution from
compensating for that fact by bringing information about the defendant's
character to their attention.5 9 Jurors will thus usually have no information
concerning how the defendant normally responds to an ordinary situation,
much less to an extraordinary situation like the one at issue in the case.
Second, it is very unlikely that the behavioral evidence in the case-
the actus reus-will be consistent with one and only one mental state.
55 Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from
Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on
Attention and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (1990).
56 Joachim I. Krueger, Return of the Ego-Self-Referent Information as a Filter for
Social Prediction: Comment on Karniol (2003), 110 PSYCHOIL. REv. 585, 589 (2003).
57 Ames, supra note 54, at 166. Note that Ames uses the term stereotyping instead of
prototyping. In this context, the two are equivalent. See Jennifer Eno Louden & Jennifer L.
Skeem, Constructing Insanity: Jurors' Prototypes, Attitudes, and Legal Decision-Making, 25
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 449, 451 (2007) ("[T]he most widely used definition of stereotypes
portrays them as prototypes that focus on people and are associated with strong attitudes that
are resistant to change. Thus, stereotypes can be viewed as a subtype of prototypes that are
distinguished primarily by their emotional connotation."). I use prototyping for consistency
and clarity.
58 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3, at 1043 (3d ed.
2000).
59 See FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (prohibiting the use of evidence of character to prove conduct
in conformity therewith). "'Character is a generalized description of one's disposition ... 
Id. 406, advisory committee's note (citation omitted).
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Contrary to functionalist theorizing, "there is no one-to-one correspondence
between events and other people's reactions to these events; people do not
always react the same way to a given event, and the same psychological
reaction can be elicited in many different ways., 60 That does not mean a
juror will see all of the possible mental-state inferences in a criminal case as
equally reasonable; the behavioral evidence may make some mental-state
inferences more plausible than others. But it seems very unlikely that a
juror trying to determine the defendant's mental state in a case involving a
murder or a rape, for example, will view the behavioral evidence as
unambiguous, given that such complex acts are particularly difficult to
mindread.6' Moreover, the juror will not be mindreading in a vacuum: his
determination will be framed by the competing descriptions of the
defendant's mental state offered by the prosecution and the defense, a
conflict that cannot help but reinforce the ambiguity of the behavioral
evidence.
62
Both the default primacy of extra-target mindreading strategies and the
general ambiguity of the actus reus in a criminal case indicate, in short, that
jurors are likely to use projection and prototyping, instead of functionalist
theorizing, to determine a defendant's mental state. Indeed, that is exactly
what a significant number of empirical studies of mindreading in the legal
context have found. That research is discussed in the next Part.
IV. PROJECTION
A. PROJECTION DESCRIBED
As we have seen, the functionalist model of mindreading makes two
basic assumptions: (1) that jurors have an intuitive theory of mind that
consists of commonsense generalizations about the causal relationships
between external circumstances, mental states, and physical behavior; and
(2) that jurors mindread by applying their intuitive theory of mind to the
60 Rachel Karniol, Egocentrism Versus Protocentrism: The Status of Self in Social
Prediction, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 564, 564 (2003); see also THOMAS 0. BUFORD, ESSAYS ON
OTHER MINDS xi (1970) ("Mental events and physical behavior are contingently
related .... ).
61 See, e.g., Candeub, supra note 17, at 2102 ("As soon as one develops more complex
acts ... certainty falls away and one can eliminate other potentially attributable mental states
far less easily. Some types of acts can be done with numerous purposes in mind, and simply
observing the act or describing it in purely physical terms will not reveal which of these
purposes is, in fact, controlling the actor's mind when the act is being committed.").
62 This framing effect should be even more pronounced in cases in which the prosecution
charges the defendant with related crimes that are distinguished from each other only by the
mental state they require. If the prosecution does not believe that behavioral evidence is
unambiguous, how can a juror?
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evidence in the defendant's case and then imputing the resulting mental
state to the defendant.
The projection model of mindreading conceptualizes mental-state
determinations very differently. It does not assume that jurors possess an
intuitive theory of mind; indeed, interest in the model was originally
sparked by suspicion that functionalist mindreading "is too information
rich-that it attributes too much knowledge and sophistication to
mindreaders, even if the knowledge is only tacit or unconscious. ''63 Instead,
it assumes that individuals are "information poor" but possess a "special
skill, namely, constructing pretend, simulated or imaginary mental
states... in simulated processing., 64 That skill, according to the projection
model, is at the heart of mindreading:
In using the simulation heuristic to detect a target's mental state.., an attributor
begins by taking the target's "perspective." That is, he pretends to be in certain states
the target is in, as suggested by his previous information about the target .... He
feeds these "pretend" starting states into an appropriate cognitive mechanism of his
own... and lets it operates on them. This mechanism outputs a new state ... and the
attributor then attributes that decision to the target. In other words, the attributor tries
to make his own mind "emulate" the mental sequence the target will go
through .... The heart of this procedure is that the attributor tries to reproduce or
match what transpires in the target ... 65
This form of projection is prospective: the mindreader uses simulation
to move forward from information about the target's situation-his physical
environment and whatever is known about his psychological
characteristics-to the target's mental state.66  Projection can also be
retrospective, using simulation to move backward from the target's physical
behavior-the criminal act itself-to the mental state that caused it.
Goldman describes this use of projection as a "generate and test strategy":
The attributor begins with a known effect of a sought-after state, often an
observable piece of behavior. He generates one or more hypotheses about the prior
mental state or combination of states that might be responsible for this effect. He then
"tests" (one or more of) these hypotheses by pretending to be in these states, feeding
them into an appropriate psychological mechanism, and seeing whether the output
matches the observed evidence. When a match is found (perhaps the first match, or
the "best" match), he attributes the hypothesized state or combination of states to the
target.
67
63 Goldman & Mason, supra note 3, at 272.
64 id.
65 Alvin I. Goldman, Desire, Intention, and the Simulation Theory, in INTENTIONS AND
INTENTIONALITY: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION 207, 217 (Bertram F. Malle et al. eds.,
2001).
66 GOLDMAN, supra note 50, at 45.
67 Id.
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Neither form of projection, it is important to note, is completely
atheoretical. In particular, "there might be theory in deciding which pretend
inputs to construct, and in transferring out simulated state or behavior from
ourselves to the target., 68  The former moment is particularly important,
because the goal of projection is not to determine the mental state the
mindreader would have had in the target's situation, but to determine what
mental state the mindreader would have had in the target's situation if he
were the target. Accurate projection thus depends, as explored in detail
below, 69 on the mindreader's ability to adopt the target's characteristics and
to prevent his own characteristics from influencing the simulation process.
Despite these theoretical moments, however, the core of projection
remains the mindreader's imaginative act of simulating, experiencing, and
reacting to the target's situation: "acknowledging that accuracy of inputs
requires informational guidance doesn't undercut the simulational aspect of
the cognitive performances in question; the inputs are inputs for
simulation. 70 Indeed, the act of projection could not be more different than
functionalist theorizing, given the latter's emphasis on the logical and
mechanical application of commonsense generalizations about the causal
relationships between external circumstances, mental states, and physical
behavior. In particular, there is no room in functionalist theorizing for
projection's transfer of one of the mindreader's mental states-the mental
state generated by the act of simulation-onto the target; by definition, the
commonsense generalizations that the functionalist mindreader applies are
derived from his experientially acquired intuitive theory of mind, not from
introspection.
If jurors use projection to mindread, they most likely rely on a hybrid
form of projection, one that is both prospective and retrospective. In
criminal cases that focus on mens rea, jurors will usually have two different
kinds of information: (1) evidence concerning the defendant's situation,
such as the circumstances in which he committed the crime and the mental
state that he was in prior to finding himself in those circumstances; and (2)
68 Goldman & Mason, supra note 3, at 273; see also Nicholas Epley et al., Perspective
Taking as Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustment, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 327,
338 (2004) (noting that adjustments to mindreaders' simulations are "likely guided by their
theories about how different perspectives and psychological states influence judgment and
perception").
69 See infra notes 177-232 and accompanying text.
70 GOLDMAN, supra note 50, at 175; see also Robert M. Gordon, The Simulation Theory:
Objections and Misconceptions, 7 MIND & LANGUAGE 11, 18 (1992) ("[E]ven where we do
make use of generalizations that correlate external circumstances with behavior, it is not the
generalizations themselves, that is, the generalizations mechanically applied, that explain our
predictive or explanatory competence: it is our skill at using the generalizations as heuristics
or rules of thumb as we simulate others.").
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a critical "observable piece" of the defendant's behavior, namely, the actus
reus of the crime. They will thus have the raw material they need to project
both prospectively (from the defendant's situation to his mental state) and
retrospectively (from the actus reus to the defendant's mental state).
There is, moreover, another critical difference between general
mindreading and juror mindreading that we need to consider. Whereas
mindreaders usually have to generate the hypotheses they test through
projection on their own, the prosecution and defense in a criminal case
generate those hypotheses for them. In some cases, there will be only two
competing hypotheses-a murder case, for example, in which the only issue
is whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time of the crime. In
others, there may be far more than two, such as a murder case in which the
prosecution charges the defendant with various degrees of murder and the
defense argues both self-defense and provocation.
What, then, does projection-based mindreading look like in the legal
context? The mechanics of projection and the nature of criminal trials
suggest a model in which a juror uses a two-stage process of projection to
test the various mental states offered by the prosecution and defense. In
stage one, the juror runs a retrospective simulation in which he tries to
imagine having a particular mental state in the defendant's situation. If he
cannot imagine having that mental state, he rejects it and repeats the first
stage with the next one. But if he can imagine having it, he then proceeds
to stage two and runs a prospective simulation in which he tries to imagine
that mental state leading him to commit the actus reus of the crime. If he
cannot imagine committing the crime, he rejects the mental state and returns
to stage one with the next possible mental state. But if he can imagine
committing it, the projection process stops and he imputes that mental state
to the defendant.
Variations on this model are certainly possible. Perhaps, instead of
ending the projection process as soon as he finds a matching mental state, a
juror tries to simulate all of the mental states offered by the prosecution and
defense and chooses the state that best matches the actus reus of the
crime.7" Or perhaps projection is more of a gestalt process in which the
juror simply imagines committing the crime in the defendant's situation,
identifies what mental state he is in, and imputes that state to the defendant.
The critical point is that, whatever form it actually takes, projection
provides a coherent explanation of how jurors mindread.
71 See GOLDMAN, supra note 50, at 45.
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B. EVIDENCE OF PROJECTION
A significant amount of empirical research suggests that jurors use
projection to make mental-state determinations. That research can be
divided into two categories: general mindreading studies and studies of jury
decision-making.
1. General Research
Cognitive psychologists have long recognized that projection is one of
the most basic-and most stubbom-mindreading mechanisms:
When people predict the thoughts, feelings, or behaviors of others, they tend to
assume that these others think, feel, and behave as they themselves do .... Although
the strength of projection varies, no particular person characteristic or type of
judgment item consistently fails to show projection. People project even when they
are asked not to or when they receive feedback on the accuracy of their
predictions ... ; they project regardless of their level of cognitive busyness ... and
regardless of information they have about other individuals ....
Indeed, the tendency to assume that others "think, feel, and behave" as
they do is so tenacious that it routinely leads individuals to mindread
inaccurately. As noted above, accurate projection requires the mindreader
to quarantine his self-perspective: the goal of the simulation process is to
determine the target's mental state, not the mindreader's. Nevertheless,
such quarantining often fails, contaminating the simulation process. For
example, "people in one emotional situation.., project their current
preferences and behaviors onto other people who are in different emotional
situations"7 3 -a phenomenon known as an "empathy gap.",74 Such empathy
gaps were evident in a study that asked individuals to predict whether
hikers lost in the mountains without supplies would feel greater regret about
not bringing food or not bringing water with them. In comparison to
participants who were asked to exercise before making their predictions-
and who were thus in the same "hot" emotional state as the imaginary
hikers-participants who were not asked to exercise were far less likely to
predict that they would regret not bringing water more than they would
regret not bringing food.75
Another example of a projection-induced error is the curse of
knowledge, where individuals permit their knowledge to interfere with their
72 Russell W. Clement & Joachim Krueger, Social Categorization Moderates Social
Projection, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 219 (2002).
73 Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Cross-Situational Projection, in THE SELF IN
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 43, 49 (Mark D. Alicke et al. eds., 2005).
74 id.
" Id. at 51-52.
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attempts to simulate others who are not only less knowledgeable, but whom
they know are less knowledgeable, than they are.76 One study, for example,
asked well-informed businessmen to predict how individuals they knew
were less informed would forecast corporate earnings. The study was
designed to reward the mindreaders for quarantining their own superior
knowledge; nevertheless, "the predictors failed to discount their own
knowledge completely, so their predictions partly reflected their proprietary
knowledge. 77
Such errors are troubling, because there is no reason to believe that
jurors are any less prone to them than ordinary mindreaders-an issue
discussed extensively below.78 The existence of those errors, however, is
still powerful evidence that jurors do, in fact, mindread through
projection. 79  Indeed, functionalist theorizing cannot explain projection-
based errors like empathy gaps and the curse of knowledge. Although a
mindreader may well assume that a hiker in a hot emotional state will feel
differently than a hiker in a cold emotional state, the attribution process is
not supposed to be affected by which emotional state the mindreader is
in-the same commonsense generalizations apply in both situations.
Similarly, "[h]ow could an intuitive theory account for the curse of
knowledge? Does everyone afflicted with the curse of knowledge accept as
a general proposition that 'other people believe whatever I believe'?,
80
2. Jury Studies
Cognitive psychologists have not directly studied projection in the
context of juror decision-making. A number of studies, however, provide
strong circumstantial evidence that jurors sometimes use projection to
mindread.
76 Boaz Keysar et al., States of Affairs and States of Mind: The Effects of Knowledge on
Beliefs, 64 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 283, 283 (1995).
77 GOLDMAN, supra note 50, at 165-66.
71 See infra Part V.A.
79 See Goldman & Mason, supra note 3, at 285 ("These findings are congenial to
simulation theory because one of the crucial underlying ideas of the theory is that
mindreading involves a projection, imputation, or transference of one's own mental state to
the target.").
80 GOLDMAN, supra note 50, at 168. According to Van Boven and Loewenstein, the
curse of knowledge "stems partly from the hindsight bias. That is, informed people's biased
predictions of the knowledge of uninformed individuals stems from informed people's
biased 'postdictions' of what their knowledge was before being informed." Van Boven &
Loewenstein, supra note 73, at 48. That is an explicitly projection-based explanation of the
curse, and one that is supported by empirical evidence. See id. (noting that the thesis "that
informed participants' hindsight bias produced a corresponding curse of knowledge is
supported by the close correspondence between self- and social-predictions").
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a. Consent
Research into sexual intent attributions is particularly illuminating.
Olsen-Fulero and Fulero have found, for example, that the most important
variable minimizing the likelihood that a juror will blame a rape victim for
being raped is "the degree to which a juror identifies with the
victim.., because they are similar or in some other way appealing ... ."81
They explained their finding by arguing that jurors who identify with
victims blame them less for being raped because "they are more likely to be
able to empathize with them and take their role so that the actor-observer
difference is reduced .... In other words: (1) jurors who identify with
the victim find it easier to put themselves in the victim's position than those
who do not; and (2) the easier it is for jurors to put themselves in the
victim's position, the more likely they are to understand -and agree with the
victim's account of what happened-namely, that she did not consent. That
explanation is consistent with the projection model, particularly its
emphasis on perspective-taking and its assumption that identification is
83based on similarity between a juror and his mindreading target.
Research by Lenton and her colleagues further supports the idea that
jurors use projection to make mental-state determinations in rape cases. In
their study, college students were divided into two groups, those who were
interested in having casual sex and those weren't. The two groups were
then asked to read a scenario about a man and a woman on a first date and
assess the character's sexual intent. The researchers found that students in
the "seeking casual sex" category imputed higher levels of sexual intent to
the characters than the students in the "not seeking casual sex" category-a
finding they specifically attributed to projection: "men's and women's
judgments of sexual intent generally arise from one common projective
process in which perceivers use their own standing on some issue to infer
that of others. 84
To be sure, the study did not specifically address mindreading in a
criminal case, thus providing only indirect support for the idea that jurors
mindread through projection. The researchers made clear, though, that they
believed their findings applied to jury decision-making: their interest in the
relationship between projection and judgments of sexual intent stemmed
81 Lynda Olsen-Fulero & Solomon M. Fulero, Commonsense Rape Judgments: An
Empathy-Complexity Theory of Rape Juror Story Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 402,
409 (1997).
82 Id.
83 See infra notes 153-56, 218-32 and accompanying text.
84 Alison P. Lenton et al., We Want the Same Thing: Projection in Judgments of Sexual
Intent, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 975, 977 (2007).
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from their recognition that "misjudgments may be related to sexual
9585coercion, sexual harassment, and rape ....
b. Murder
Additional evidence for projection comes from a cross-cultural study
of murder attributions by Morris and Peng. In the study, American and
Chinese graduate students were asked to read newspaper reports about
actual murders and evaluate whether the killings resulted from the killer's
disposition (character) or situation (external circumstances). They were
then presented with counterfactual scenarios and asked to imagine whether
the murders would still have occurred. As the researchers expected, culture
played a significant role in the results. In the first task, "Chinese people
represent[ed] behavior as situationally caused and Americans represent[ed]
it as dispositionally caused.",8 6  In the second task, "Chinese subjects
simulated that the person would have taken a less bloody course of action in
different situations, whereas Americans simulated that the person's
murderous disposition would have inexorably expressed itself, regardless of
changes in the situation. 87
Despite their use of the term "simulation," Morris and Peng did not
specifically conclude that the graduate students determined the killers'
mental states through projection. 88 That is, however, a reasonable inference
from their results. First, Morris and Peng rejected the idea that prototyping
could explain the graduate students' very different cultural attributions.89
Second, other researchers have used projection to explain why
situation/disposition mindreading attributions are so deeply influenced by
culture:
If one perceives oneself as embedded within a larger context of which one is an
interdependent part, it is likely that other objects or events will be perceived in a
similar way. For example, a given event involving a particular actor will be perceived
85 Id. at 975.
86 Michael W. Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese
Attributions for Social and Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 949, 964
(1994).
87 Id. at 964-65.
88 It is also important to note that the disposition-situation distinction does not directly
correlate with specific mental states. The study is still useful, however, because it clearly
required the graduate students to understand the thought processes of the killers-did the
killers "intend" to kill, or were they "compelled" to kill by the force of circumstance?
89 Morris & Peng, supra note 86, at 965 (noting that "scripts would not lead to a general
pattern of greater dispositionalism across everyday behavioral settings," and that whereas
"[a]ttributional patterns due to stereotypes would be restricted in scope to particular types of
social actors or groups .... [C]ultural differences in attribution are far broader ....").
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as arising from the situational context of which this actor is an interdependent part,
rather than as stemming solely from the attributes of the actor.
90
That explanation makes sense. If individuals mindread by running
simulations in which they apply their own "psychological mechanisms" to
the target's situation, an individual who sees his own actions as constrained
by situational factors will be far more likely to attribute a situationally-
influenced mental state to the target than an individual who believes that his
actions are produced by his internal disposition.
c. Mistake
Projection also likely explains the results of an experiment by Finkel
and his colleagues that used a fictionalized version of the Bernhard Goetz
murder trial to study the impact of mistake on self-defense claims. In the
baseline scenario, a teenager stood over the defendant, pointed a gun at his
head, and demanded five dollars; the defendant then pulled a gun out of his
jacket and killed the youth-a classic self-defense situation, and one that
led mock jurors to acquit 62.5% of the time. The researchers then presented
the mock jurors with four variations on the baseline scenario in which
increasingly unlikely mistakes led the defendant to kill: a reasonable
mistake, in which the victim turned out to be carrying a lifelike toy gun; a
dubious mistake, in which the victim was not carrying a gun but seemed to
be reaching into his pocket for something; an unreasonable mistake, in
which the victim was not carrying a gun and did not reach into his pocket;
and finally a delusional mistake, in which the victim was sitting on the
other side of the subway car doing a crossword puzzle and occasionally
making eye contact with the defendant. 9' Not surprisingly, as the mistake
became increasingly implausible, jurors became increasingly skeptical of
the defendant's claim that he honestly believed he was acting in self-
defense: 79% acquitted the reasonable mistake; 25% acquitted the dubious
mistake; 4% acquitted the unreasonable mistake; and no one acquitted the
delusional mistake.92
The question, of course, is how the mock jurors determined whether
the defendant honestly believed that he was about to be killed.
Functionalist theorizing seems an unlikely candidate, for two reasons. First,
the behavioral evidence in the scenarios was ambiguous: the killing itself
was consistent with both an intentional killing and self-defense-which is
90 Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self. Implications for
Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224, 246 (1991).
91 Norman J. Finkel et al., Lay Perspectives on Legal Conundrums: Impossible and
Mistaken Act Cases, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 593, 603-04 (1995).
92 Id. at 605.
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why the researchers chose it-and the non-unanimous verdicts for all but
the delusional scenario indicate that there was no one-to-one
correspondence between the circumstances that led to the killing and the
defendant's mental state. (Even the classic self-defense baseline scenario
led nearly 40% of the jurors to convict.) Second, jurors would have to
possess a remarkably complex web of commonsense generalizations to
distinguish so carefully between the scenarios-precisely the kind of
"information rich" explanation that "attributes too much knowledge and
sophistication to mindreaders."
The results make complete sense, however, if jurors used projection to
mindread the defendant. As Finkel has pointed out, a mistake defense
requires jurors "to climb down and stand in the shoes and subjectivity of the
defendants, in order to see what they see, 93 because "the defendant's past
experience, developmental history and acculturation, traumas and scars all
may play a part in how he or she perceives events. 9 4 Moreover, killing in
self-defense seems like the kind of situation that a juror could convincingly
simulate, even if (as is likely) he had never been in a similar situation
himself. Finally, the mock jurors were not instructed to acquit only those
mistakes that were reasonable,95 a requirement that may push jurors away
from projection and toward prototyping. 96 It thus makes sense to assume
that the mock jurors determined whether the defendant honestly acted in
self-defense by imagining themselves in the various situations, simulating
their interaction with the victim, and determining whether they would have
honestly believed they were about to be killed.
d. Capital Sentencing
Finally, Haney has specifically used projection to explain how jurors
decide whether to sentence a defendant convicted of capital murder to
death, a decision that requires them to assess the defendant's "personal
culpability" for the crime.97 Haney and his colleagues asked capital jurors
to sentence a convicted murderer on the basis of extensive information
concerning the nature of the crime and the murderer's life-history. In later
interviews, a number of the jurors "gave accounts of having engaged in a
93 F[NKEL, supra note 28, at 229.
94 Id. at 230.
95 See Finkel et al., supra note 91, at 606 ("It is important to note that subjectivity's
limits were not imposed by the law through judicial instructions, as no legal instructions
were given in either experiment. These limits, it would seem, derive from ordinary common
sense.").
96 See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
97 Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital Punishment: Problematizing the
"Will of the People," 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 303, 330 n. 109 (1997).
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decision-making process in which they embraced a narrative version of the
defendant's life, put themselves in his shoes, as it were, and came to an




First and foremost, substantive criminal law is concerned with defining
the elements of specific crimes. 99 Some crimes require nothing more than
conduct and a mental state, while others also require the presence of certain
circumstances and/or the creation of certain harmful results) 00 Regardless
of how they are defined, though, due process requires the prosecution to
prove all of the elements of a crime "beyond a reasonable doubt."10 1
Individual crimes are thus bundles of conditions that are "singly necessary
and jointly sufficient": the failure to prove any element of a crime, no
matter how seemingly insignificant, entitles the defendant to acquittal.
0 2
A particular model of jury decision-making is implicit in this formal
approach to criminal responsibility. Specifically, the approach assumes (1)
that jurors actually understand crimes as bundles of "singly necessary and
jointly sufficient" elements, and (2) that jurors will convict only when the
prosecution proves all of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Empirical research, however, contradicts both assumptions. To begin with,
jurors mentally represent crimes as loosely-structured prototypes, not as
bundles of essential elements:
[T]he features contained in people's naive representations of crime categories do
not operate as necessary conditions. Rather, these naive concepts appear to contain
prototypes (or typical exemplars) of crime categories. Prototypes are summary
representations of the characteristics of category members. 
103
98 Id. at 329.
99 See LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.2(a), at 7.
'oo Id. at 8-9.
101 See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) ("[T]he Due Process
Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged.").
102 See Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the
Law, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 509 (1993).
103 Id. at 509; see also Nancy Cantor et al., A Prototype Analysis of Psychological
Situations, 14 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 45, 46-47 (1982) ("[K]nowledge about any given
category is structured around, and represented in long-term memory as, a prototype which
captures the meaning of the category .... [One form of the prototype could be] an abstract
set of features commonly associated with members of a category, with each feature assigned
a weight according to degree of association with the category." (citations omitted)).
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Research indicates that jurors possess prototypes for a wide variety of
crimes, including, inter alia, assault,
10 4  burglary,'0 5  kidnapping, 10 6
murder, 10 7 robbery,'0 8 stalking, 1°9 rape,"o manslaughter,"1 ' euthanasia,"'
and infanticide."13  These prototypes rarely correspond to the legal
definition of a crime, an issue explored in detail below."14  The most
common juror prototype for assault, for example, is simply a physical attack
that injures the victim,"15 a prototype that completely neglects the
requirement that the victim reasonably fear bodily harm." 
6
Even more troubling, a number of studies have shown that jurors do
not view the features associated with a particular prototype as "singly
necessary and jointly sufficient": if the characteristics of the defendant's
crime match the features of the prototype closely enough, jurors will
convict even in the absence of one (or more) of the features." 7 Smith, for
example, presented mock jurors with fourteen scenarios involving five
different kinds of crimes-assault, burglary, kidnapping, murder, and
robbery-and asked them to determine the defendant's guilt.' I  Each
104 Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts,





109 Susan Dennison & Donald M. Thomson, Community Perceptions of Stalking: What
Are the Fundamental Concerns?, 7 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 159, 166 (2000).
110 Norman J. Finkel & Jennifer L. Groscup, Crime Prototypes, Objective Versus
Subjective Culpability, and a Commonsense Balance, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 224
(1997); Heather L. Littleton & Danny Axsom, Rape and Seduction Scripts of University
Students: Implications for Rape Attributions and Unacknowledged Rape, 49 SEx ROLES 465,
470 (2003).
111 Finkel & Groscup, supra note 110, at 219.
112 Id. at 218.
113 Norman J. Finkel et al., Commonsense Judgments of Infanticide: Murder,
Manslaughter, Madness, or Miscellaneous?, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1113, 1133
(2000).
114 See infra notes 233-57 and accompanying text.
115 See Smith, supra note 104, at 861 tbl.1.
116 See, e.g., ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL
CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: IPI CRIMINAL § 11.02 (2d ed. 1981).
117 See, e.g., Finkel & Groscup, supra note 110, at 212 ("Unlike the legal crime category
of murder, for example, where a set of necessary and sufficient conditions determines
category membership, ordinary citizens may not use a set of defining features in determining
category membership, but a graded organization, where 'prototypicality' determines
inclusion."); Jennifer L. Skeem & Stephen L. Golding, Describing Jurors' Personal
Conceptions of Insanity and Their Relationship to Case Judgments, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
&L. 561, 569 (2001).
118 Smith, supra note 104, at 860-6 1.
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scenario omitted at least one essential element of the crime involved in the
scenario, legally requiring the defendant's acquittal." 9 The results of the
experiment were shocking:
The proportion of guilty votes was computed for each scenario and tested against
zero. If a target feature is necessary, then subjects should vote not guilty when the
feature is not present. To the extent that the conviction rate exceeds zero, subjects are
not using the omitted feature as a necessary condition. Across the 14 critical
scenarios, the conviction rates ranged from 71% to 100%, with a mode of 100%. All
of the conviction rates significantly exceeded zero ... , indicating that none of the
frequently listed features was a necessary condition for guilt. It appears, then, that
these attributes are associated with the crime categories but do not operate as defining
features. 
120
Smith then conducted another experiment to test her proposed
explanation of those results: namely, that because jurors "determine the
guilt or innocence of a defendant by comparing the characteristics of the
defendant's crime with the features of their prototype[,] [g]uilty verdicts
would result if there was sufficient feature overlap [and] not-guilty verdicts
would result if the correspondence was low. 1 21 That is exactly what the
second experiment found-in each case "the typicality of the fact situation
influenced subjects' verdict choices."'
' 22
The key question for our purposes, of course, is what role mental-state
determinations play in the prototyping process. In terms of crime
prototypes, there are two possible answers. The first and most troubling is
that, for certain crimes, jurors simply make no attempt at all to mindread
because their prototypes do not require the defendant to possess a particular
mental state. Juror prototypes of stalking, for example, almost never
mention the stalker intending to harm or cause fear in his target.1
23
Many crime prototypes, by contrast, do contain mens rea requirements.
Most prototypes of murder, for example, include the defendant intending to
kill the victim. 24  Indeed, such prototypes should be the rule, not the
exception: "Generic representations include information regarding typical
settings, typical characters, temporal sequence of events, causal relations,
and the prototypic person's thoughts and feelings in these situations.'
125
"19 Id. at 861.
120 Id. at 861-62.
121 Id. at 859.
122 Id. at 865.
123 See infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
124 See Smith, supra note 104, at 861 tbl. 1; Richard L. Wiener et al., The Psychology of
Telling Murder Stories: Do We Think in Scripts, Exemplars, or Prototypes?, 20 BEHAV. SCi.
&L. 119, 131 tbl.3 (2002).
125 Karniol, supra note 60, at 569; see also Cantor et al., supra note 103, at 65 ("[A]
substantial part of the consensual descriptions of situations are psychological in nature; they
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When a prototype does reference a particular mental state, the nature of
prototyping suggests that jurors will treat the mental state as just another
feature of the prototype, one of the many features that determine the overall
typicality of the defendant's act.
That explanation, however, still implicates the fundamental
mindreading question: how does a juror determine whether the defendant
possessed the prototypical mental state? The evidence suggests two
methods. To begin with, prototypes contain the "typical character" and the
typical character's "thoughts and feelings" in the prototypic situation.
26
This suggests that if jurors conclude the defendant is the kind of person who
typically commits a particular crime, they will also conclude that he
possessed the mental state associated with the prototype. Indeed, that is
exactly what research indicates. A study of infanticide prototypes, for
example, found that defendants under age eighteen are much less likely to
be convicted of first-degree murder-killing with premeditation-than
defendants over the age of eighteen. 12 7 Similarly, another study found that
black defendants are far more likely to be held criminally responsible for
"prototypically black" crimes like soliciting, mugging, and auto theft than
white defendants.
128
Prototypes also include "the prototypic person's thoughts and feelings"
in "typical settings."12 9  This suggests that if jurors conclude that the
defendant's actions are consistent with the prototypical situation, they will
conclude that he possessed the prototypic mental state as well. Differently
put, prototypes contain images of what particular mental states "look
like"-images of how particular mental states are typically translated into
action. The infanticide research mentioned above, for example, found
that jurors generally associate premeditation with particularly violent
methods of killing, such as striking the baby with a blunt object, and the
absence of premeditation with less violent methods, such as suffocation.
1 31
include details about the most appropriate behavior for a situation, the feelings associated
with 'being in a situation,' and the typical reactions and behavior of others in the situation.").
126 Kamiol, supra note 60, at 569; see also Cantor et al., supra note 103, at 59 n.3
("Person images might include components such as physical appearance, personality
characteristics, opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and typical behaviors, actions and interactions
engaged in by the Person.").
127 See Finkel et al., supra note 113, at 1130.
128 See Christopher S. Jones & Martin F. Kaplan, The Effects of Racially Stereotypical
Crimes on Juror Decision-Making and Information-Processing Strategies, 25 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2003).
129 Kamiol, supra note 60, at 569.
130 For a fuller discussion of this issue, see infra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
131 See Finkel et al., supra note 113, at 1129.
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The discussion thus far has focused specifically on crime prototypes.
Jurors also appear to possess prototypes of certain defenses. Skeem and
Golding, for example, designed a series of experiments to determine
whether jurors assess a defendant's insanity defense by matching the
defendant's characteristics to their prototype of the "typical" insane person.
Here is how they described their hypothesis:
Just as jurors represent verdict categories in general criminal cases with crime
prototypes, so too may jurors represent verdict categories in insanity cases with
prototypes of insanity. Jurors may rely on their prototypes of insanity to construe the
facts of the case and render a verdict on the basis of a prototype similarity matching
process. A juror may make attributions about a defendant's cognitive and volitional
impairments by comparing the defendant's characteristics to those of her prototype of
the criminally insane defendant. The more closely the defendant's attributes match
those of her prototype, the more likely she is to judge that defendant a member of the
category "insane."
The experiments strongly supported the hypothesis. In particular,
Skeem and Golding concluded (1) that "jurors have complex, multifaceted
prototypes of insanity that cannot be reduced to legal tests of insanity or to
psychiatric diagnoses," 133 and (2) that "prototypes of insanity are associated
with case-relevant attitudes and strongly affect the way in which jurors
construe case facts and render verdicts."
134
Like crime prototypes, defense prototypes appear to take person-
centered and situation-centered forms-and sometimes both. Juror
prototypes of battered woman's syndrome, for example, are personological:
the prototypical battered woman is young, fragile, guilt-ridden, confused,
and depressed; rarely interacts with others; has children and is financially
dependent on her partner; makes excuses for her partner's behavior; and
accepts her abuse passively, without fighting back.135 Juror prototypes of
consent, by contrast, are primarily situational136: the prototypical woman
who consents to sex flirted with her alleged rapist, went to his (or her)
apartment, and engaged in consensual kissing or petting. 37 Finally, juror
132 Skeem & Golding, supra note 117, at 569. "Category membership is based on a
similarity matching process; as the number of features that the object shares with the
category's prototype increases, so does the likelihood that the object is deemed a member of
the category." Id. at 568.
' Id. at 604.
134 Id.
135 See Brenda L. Russell & Linda S. Melillo, Attitudes Toward Battered Women Who
Kill: Defendant Typicality and Judgments of Culpability, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 219, 225-
26 (2006).
136 Consent prototypes also often contain personological aspects. For example, jurors
strongly associate provocative dress with consent. See Littleton & Axsom, supra note 110,
at 469 tbl.I.
131 See id. at 472 tbl.III.
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prototypes can be both personological and situational. Some jurors, for
example, view a defendant as insane if he looks like the proverbial "wild
beast," while others base their insanity judgment on whether the defendant
committed the crime in a suitably "bizarre" fashion.1
38
Finally, there is the issue of how jurors acquire the crime and defense
prototypes they use to make mental-state determinations. With prototypes
in general, there are two basic methods of acquisition: through experience
and from exposure to "other sources," such as the media. 139  Legal
prototypes, however, almost certainly come primarily from the media, not
from experience. As Valerie Hans has observed, "[b]ecause a relatively
small proportion of the public has direct experience with the justice system,
public knowledge and views of law and the legal system are largely
dependent on media representations."140  That conclusion is supported by
Holst and Pezdek's study of robbery prototypes, which revealed that nearly
90% of the participants had learned what a "typical" robbery looked like
from the media, with 50% discovering information from television shows,
23% from the news media, and 16% from movies.1
41
B. EVIDENCE OF PROTOTYPING
As a theory of mindreading, prototyping is based on two assumptions:
(1) that jurors mentally represent crimes and defenses as prototypes, and (2)
that jurors make at least some mental-state attributions on the basis of the
correspondence between the evidence in the defendant's case-situational
and/or personological-and specific prototypes. I have already discussed
much of the empirical research that supports the first assumption and have
touched on the research that supports the second. In what follows, I will
discuss other research that supports the idea that evidence-prototype
matching often underlies jurors' mindreading.
138 See Caton F. Roberts et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility: Decision
Making and the Insanity Defense, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 207, 222-23 (1987).
139 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Sherman, Development and Mental Representation of
Stereotypes, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1126, 1127 (1996) (noting that the
information underlying prototypes "may be acquired from firsthand personal experience with
group members or through social learning from family, friends, and the media").
140 Valerie P. Hans, Law and the Media: An Overview and Introduction, 14 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 399, 399 (1990); see Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and
Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 NEB. L. REV.
742, 777 (1995); see also Smith, supra note 102, at 508 (noting that most jurors "have had
some exposure to the law through informal sources, such as movies, television, newspapers,
and word of mouth. From these sources, jurors may have abstracted representations of many
legal concepts that they can access for decision making .... ").
141 Valerie Fisher Hoist & Kathy Pezdek, Scripts for Typical Crimes and Their Effects on
Memory for Eyewitness Testimony, 6 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 573, 580 (1992).
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1. Crimes
In one revealing study, Jones and Kaplan examined whether jurors
would be more likely to hold defendants responsible for race-congruent
crimes than race-incongruent crimes. 142 The study extended previous work
indicating that the race of the defendant is one of the characteristic features
of most crime prototypes.1 43 The results were dramatic: "When charged
with a racially congruent crime, the defendant is perceived to be more
responsible for that crime and the behaviors tend to be attributed more to
internal rather than to external factors."'
144
The infanticide study mentioned earlier also strongly supports
evidence/prototype matching. The study was designed to elicit jurors'
prototypes of infanticide and examine how those prototypes influenced their
mental-state attributions. 145  To do so, the researchers presented college
students with nine different versions of a fictional criminal case in which a
woman is charged with first-degree murder for killing her newborn child.
146
The defendant claims that the killing was caused by her depression,
negativing premeditation and requiring the jury to find her either guilty of
voluntary manslaughter or guilty but mentally ill. The nine versions
differed in terms of four main variables: the extent of the defendant's
depression (simple depression, postpartum depression, depression with
psychosis); the time between birth and the murder (one day, one week, three
months); the age of the woman (fourteen, nineteen, twenty-six); and the
manner of death (abandonment, suffocation, blunt-force trauma). The
jurors were asked to read each version of the case and reach the appropriate
verdict.
147
The results of the study revealed that the prototypic infanticide is a
situation in which a young mother suffering from depression suffocates her
baby almost as soon as it is born, and that infanticide verdicts are
determined by the degree to which the facts of the defendant's case match
that prototype. As the age of the defendant increased, so did attributions of
142 Jones & Kaplan, supra note 128.
143 See, e.g., Michael Sunnafrank & Norman E. Fontes, General and Crime Related
Racial Stereotypes and Influence on Juridic Decisions, 17 CORNELL J. Soc. REL. 1, 10
(1983). They found that jurors viewed crimes like soliciting, assault, mugging, auto theft,
and assault on a police officer as prototypically black, and viewed crimes like
embezzlement, child molestation, counterfeiting, and fraud as prototypically white. Id.
144 Jones & Kaplan, supra note 128, at 9. Interestingly, jurors who convicted defendants
of crimes that matched their person-prototypes were also more confident in the defendant's
guilt and punished the defendant more severely than jurors who convicted defendants of
non-matching crimes. Id.
145 Finkel et al., supra note 113, at 1121.
146 Id. at 1122.
141 Id. at 1122-23.
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premeditation. Fourteen-year-old defendants were substantially more likely
to be convicted of voluntary manslaughter or found guilty but mentally ill
than nineteen- or twenty-six-year-old defendants.1 48 Premeditation was also
positively correlated with time-the greater the gap between the baby's
birth and death, the more willing jurors were to convict the defendant of
first-degree murder.1 49  Finally, the manner of the killing significantly
affected premeditation attributions-abandoning the baby in a dumpster or




Studies of defenses also reveal prototyping. Russell and Melillo, for
example, used pre-existing research into prototypes of battered women-
summarized above-to determine whether prototypicality affects mental-
state attributions and verdict choices in cases involving battered women's
self-defense claims. The results were unequivocal:
As expected, participants in atypical/active conditions were more likely to assign
judgments of second-degree murder, whereas those in typical/passive conditions most
often rendered not-guilty verdicts. Atypical defendants were perceived to have more
options available, and respondents were less likely to believe the defendant's version
of events. In contrast, respondents rated typical defendants as more likely to meet the
requirements of self-defense. 
151
The researchers thus concluded that "judgments of culpability are
indeed influenced by the extent to which the defendant fits or does not fit
the typology of a battered woman."'
' 52
VI. PERCEIVED SIMILARITY AS THE MEDIATING MECHANISM
A. THE MECHANISM
Although both are irreconcilable with functionalist theorizing,
projection and prototyping could not be more different. A juror who
mindreads through projection tries to emulate what the defendant saw,
thought, and felt when he committed the crime; he literally tries to become
the defendant. A juror who mindreads through prototyping, by contrast, has
little interest in delving into the defendant's subjective experience; instead,
he determines the defendant's mental state by appealing to his own existing
141 Id. at 1126.
149 Id. at 1124-25.
150 Id. at 1129-30.
15 Russell & Melillo, supra note 135, at 234.
152 Id. at 235.
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preconceptions of what the "typical" crime, defense, or defendant looks
like.
As we will see, there is reason to believe that neither projection nor
prototyping is particularly likely to result in accurate mental-state
determinations. Before we reach that issue, however, we must first answer
a critical question: what determines which mindreading technique a juror
will use in a particular case?
The answer, according to Daniel Ames, is perceived similarity--the
degree to which the juror perceives the defendant to be similar to himself.
I suggest that perceptions of similarity-an idiosyncratic and subjective sense that
one is similar to a target group-moderate both projection and stereotyping in
prevalence estimates of novel attributes. This yields what could be called a similarity
contingency model of social inference... : When perceivers assume higher levels of
general similarity to a target group, they engage in higher levels of projection on
specific attributes, introspecting about their own attitudes and qualities and ascribing
them to the target .... When perceivers assume lower levels of general similarity to a
target, they engage in higher levels of stereotyping, turning to implicit beliefs about153
what a particular group is like ....
General mindreading research supports that explanation. A series of
studies conducted by Ames himself, for example, found that perceived
similarity mediates between projection and prototyping "in domains
ranging from romantic interactions to face-to-face business negotiations."'
54
Similarly, Clement and Krueger have demonstrated, through two
experiments that manipulated participants' in-group and out-group
categorizations, that "self-referent knowledge serves as a readily accessible
anchor for in-group estimates but.. . is suspended for out-group
estimates.' 55  Finally, Lenton and her colleagues have established "that
projection of sexual intent is most likely to occur when the perceiver
believes the target to be similar to himself or herself."' 56
None of these findings should come as a surprise. If the goal of
projection is to emulate what the defendant saw, thought, and felt at the
153 Daniel R. Ames, Strategies for Social Inference: A Similarity Contingency Model of
Projection and Stereotyping in Attribute Prevalence Estimates, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 573, 574 (2004); cf Clement & Krueger, supra note 72, at 219 ("There is a
striking exception [to mindreaders' general tendency to project]. The boundaries of social
categories are veritable firewalls against the spread of projection."); Karniol, supra note 60,
at 567 (suggesting that "in those domains in which self is perceived as distinct rather than as
similar to most others, self is not used to make consensus estimates").
154 Daniel R. Ames, Inside the Mind Reader's Tool Kit: Projection and Stereotyping in
Mental State Inference, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 340, 350 (2004).
155 Clement & Krueger, supra note 72, at 228.
156 Lenton et al., supra note 84, at 984; see also Dennis Krebs, Empathy and Altruism, 32
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1134, 1143 (1975) (concluding "that perception of
similarity increases the disposition to imagine how one would feel in another's place").
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time of the crime, a juror must believe ex ante that such emulation is
possible-that the defendant generally sees, thinks, and feels like he does.
That belief, in turn, is likely to exist only if the juror perceives himself to be
similar to the defendant; in the absence of perceived similarity, the juror
will have no reason to assume that he can use his own perceptions,
thoughts, and feelings as the starting point of the mindreading process. He
will thus turn instead to prototyping-his pre-existing understanding of how
people like the defendant "typically" act and what a crime like the one the
defendant is accused of committing "normally" looks like. 57
It is important to emphasize here that the mediating factor is perceived
similarity, not actual similarity. As Ames notes, "perceived general
similarity is not expected to track closely, or even at all, with measures of
actual similarity. 1 58 Indeed, empirical work suggests that it doesn't. 159 It is
thus difficult to predict what factors will lead a particular juror to see
himself as similar to, or different from, a defendant. We would expect
sociological differences to be critical: whites perceiving themselves as
different from blacks, men perceiving themselves to be different from
women, etc. It is clear, though, that such differences do not always lead
jurors to prototype. A study conducted by Van Boven and Loewenstein, for
example, found that men were willing to simulate a woman's experience of
childbirth and women were willing to simulate a man's experience of
testicular cancer.1 60 Similarly, although white mock jurors used prototyping
to assess the culpability of black defendants in Jones and Kaplan's study,
they also used prototyping to assess the culpability of white defendants. 161
157 See, e.g., Epley et al., supra note 68, at 337 ("[I]t is reasonable to assume that people
engage in such anchoring and adjustment only when it is clear that one's self is a reasonable
starting place in estimating others' perspectives. In situations where one's own perspective
is clearly irrelevant, quite different processes may be involved .... Instead, each may
generate an assessment of the other person's views based on some stored representation
(e.g., a prototype) of their ideologies and values."); Robert M. Gordon, Folk Psychology as
Simulation, in FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: THE THEORY OF MIND DEBATE 60, 65-66 (Martin Davies
& Tony Stone eds., 1995) ("Within a close-knit community, where people have a vast
common fund of 'facts' as well as shared norms and values, only a minimum of pretending
would be called for .... A person transplanted into an alien culture might have to do a great
deal of pretending to explain and predict the behavior of those around him. Indeed, one
might eventually learn to begin all attempts at explanation and prediction with a stereotypic
set of adjustments .... ").
158 Ames, supra note 153, at 575.
1' See id. at 582.
160 Van Boven & Loewenstein, supra note 73, at 46.
161 Jones & Kaplan, supra note 128, at 5. It is possible, of course, that the white mock
jurors were primed to use prototyping by the presence of black defendants and would have
used projection instead had the study only involved white defendants. The study did not
address that question.
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There may also be a motivational component to perceptions of
similarity. Studies have shown that individuals differ in their need to feel
unique.1 62 High-uniqueness jurors should be less likely to see themselves as
similar to the defendant, and thus more likely to prototype instead of
project, than low-uniqueness jurors. Indeed, studies by Ames and Iyengar
have found exactly that.1 63 Moreover, because all individuals have at least
some need to feel unique,1 64 jurors may be generally motivated to see
themselves as different from criminal defendants, particularly those who are
charged with heinous or disgusting crimes. If so, the very nature of
criminal trials may predispose jurors to prototype instead of project. That
might explain why jury decision-making studies have found far more
evidence of prototyping than evidence of projection.
165
B. NATURE OF THE CRIME OR DEFENSE
Although perceived similarity is clearly the most important
determinant of whether a juror mindreads through projection or
prototyping, that choice may also be affected by the nature of the specific
mental-state determination that the juror is asked to make. There may be an
elective affinity, in other words, between particular kinds of crimes and
defenses and particular mindreading techniques. Specifically, it seems
reasonable to suggest that the more subjective the mens rea, the more likely
a juror will be to project.
Consider, for example, the subjective version of entrapment, which
asks whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the induced offense
or was simply an "unwary innocent' 66 whose will was overborne by the
nature of the inducement. 167 It is unlikely that jurors possess prototypes of
"typical" entrapment situations, given that few (if any) jurors will have any
personal experience with entrapment and the defense is rarely the subject of
movies, television, or news reports. It thus seems more plausible to assume
162 See, e.g., C.R. Snyder & Howard L. Fromkin, Abnormality as a Positive
Characteristic: The Development and Validation of a Scale Measuring Need for Uniqueness,
86 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 518, 525 (1977).
163 Daniel R. Ames & Sheena S. Iyengar, Appraising the Unusual: Framing Effects and
Moderators of Uniqueness-Seeking and Social Projection, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 271, 280 (2005).
164 Snyder & Fromkin, supra note 162, at 525.
165 To be sure, cognitive psychologists who study jury decision-making may simply be
more interested in prototyping. Ames notes, though, that "[a]lthough projection has received
lavish scholarly attention as a source of mindreading, stereotyping has been almost entirely
ignored." Ames, supra note 54, at 163.
166 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
167 See Eugene Borgida & Roger Park, The Entrapment Defense: Juror Comprehension
and Decision Making, 12 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 19, 21 (1988).
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that a juror would determine the defendant's mental state by simulating the
defendant's entrapment situation and determining whether he (the juror)
would have been predisposed to commit the crime.
If a subjective mens rea promotes projection, an objective mens rea-a
mens rea that includes a reasonableness requirement-may promote
prototyping. A defendant is entitled to the defense of duress, for example,
only if a reasonable person in his situation would have been unable to resist
the external pressure. 168 The very nature of the defense, in other words,
communicates to jurors the need to consider more than just the defendant's
(possibly idiosyncratic) psychological responses. That message may well
lead jurors to prototype instead of project: given that most legal prototypes
are disseminated by the media, jurors are likely to see them as far more
representative of how people normally react in certain circumstances than
their own (possibly idiosyncratic) reactions.
To be sure, this interpretation of reasonableness requirements is
speculative. It is possible that jurors use projection to mindread even when
a crime's mens rea requirement is objective, assuming that their (imagined)
reaction to the defendant's situation would be representative of people
generally. One study of provocation has found that "individuals integrate,
to some extent, their own distinctive identity and characteristics when
constructing ordinariness., 169 And, as noted earlier, "[w]hen people predict
the thoughts, feelings, or behaviors of others, they tend to assume that these
others think, feel, and behave as they themselves do."
170
Notice, though, that this form of projection differs from the kind of
projection discussed earlier, in which a juror uses simulation to determine
the mental state he would have had in the defendant's situation if he were
the defendant, not the mental state he would have had in the defendant's
situation. Only such non-adjusted projection-projection in which the juror
makes no attempt to emulate the thought processes of the defendant-
would be useful for reasonableness determinations. Do jurors engage in
both forms of projection? Additional research is necessary, but it is worth
noting that at least one simulation theorist has argued that non-adjusted
projection is "the default mode of simulation."171 Moreover, as we will see
in the next Part, jurors, and individuals generally, seem to have great
difficulty making the adjustments that are necessary to ensure accurate
projection.
168 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 23.02, at 326-28 (4th ed.
2006).
169 Peter Papathanasiou & Patricia Easteal, The 'Ordinary Person' in Provocation Law:
Is the 'Objective' Standard Objective?, 11 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 53, 62 (1999).
170 Clement & Krueger, supra note 72, at 219.
171 Gordon, supra note 70, at 13.
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Finally, there is the question of how jurors will deal with what Paul
Robinson has called a "subjectivized standard of reasonableness" 172-a
standard that requires the defendant's mental state to be reasonable, but to
some extent determines reasonableness from the defendant's perspective.
73
The Model Penal Code's "extreme emotional disturbance" defense is an
example: although there must be a "reasonable explanation" for the
disturbance, "[t]he reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be."'174  Another example is the
approach taken to self-defense by cases such as State v. Wanrow, in which
the Supreme Court of Washington held that a defendant is entitled to use
the amount of force that "a reasonable person in the same
situation.. . seeing what (s)he sees and knowing what (s)he knows, then
would believe to be necessary."'175  It is difficult to predict what
mindreading technique jurors would use when faced with this kind of
subjectivized reasonableness standard. Its overall objectivity would seem
to encourage prototyping, but its subjective component would seem to
encourage projection.
VII. THE ERRORS OF PROJECTION AND PROTOTYPING
The discussion thus far has focused on how jurors mindread through
projection and prototyping. We now turn to an equally critical question: are
projection and prototyping likely to result in accurate mental-state
determinations? Unfortunately, there is reason to be skeptical.
A. THE ERRORS OF PROJECTION
We have seen that, as a mindreading technique, projection involves an
attempt by the juror to imagine not how he would have felt in the
defendant's situation, but how he would have felt in the defendant's
situation if he were the defendant. The two imaginary processes are
analytically different-and empirical research has shown that they are
phenomenologically different, as well: "imagining how another feels and
172 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 538-39 (1997).
173 See Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and
Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 5 (1998).
174 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 210.3(b) (1985). The MPC's definitions of
recklessness and negligence also contain subjectivizing language. See id. § 2.02(c)
(recklessness); id. § 2.02(d) (negligence).
17' 559 P.2d 548, 557 (Wash. 1977).
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imagining how you would feel ... produce different emotional
consequences."
' 176
There is no guarantee, however, that a juror's attempt "to make his
own mind 'emulate' the mental sequence the target will go through" will
succeed. On the contrary, accurate projection has two necessary
preconditions:
In the mindreading case, process-driven simulation can succeed in producing a
final state that is identical or isomorphic to that of the target as long as (1) the process
or mechanism driving the simulation is identical, or relatively similar, to the process
or mechanism that drives the target and (2) the initial states of the simulating system
(the attributor) are the same as, or relevantly similar to, those of the target.177
For projection to be accurate, in other words, a juror must not only
perceive himself to be similar to the defendant, he must also actually be
similar to the defendant when he engages in the act of mindreading. The
perceptions and reactions he uses to simulate the defendant's situation must
match the perception and reactions of the defendant in the actual
situation.178
Is the requisite degree of similarity likely to exist between jurors and
defendants? To answer that question, we must first distinguish between
two kinds of similarity. We might call the first natural similarity: a
situation in which the juror and the defendant are psychologically similar
simply by virtue of their shared sociological characteristics. In such a
situation, a juror will be able to accurately mindread the defendant simply
by creating a simulation that accurately reproduces the external
176 C. Daniel Batson et al., Perspective Taking: Imagining How Another Feels Versus
Imagining How You Would Feel, 23 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 756 (1997).
177 GOLDMAN, supra note 50, at 32; see also Paul L. Harris, From Simulation to Folk
Psychology: The Case for Development, in FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: THE THEORY OF MIND
DEBATE, supra note 157, at 207, 217 ("[I]t is necessary for the simulator to feed in pretend
inputs that match in the relevant particulars the situation facing the agent whose actions are
to be predicted or explained. Predictive errors will occur if inappropriate pretend inputs are
fed in."); Josef Perner, Simulation as Explicitation of Predication-Implicit Knowledge About
the Mind: Arguments for a Simulation-Theory Mix, in THEORIES OF THEORIES OF MIND 90, 94
(Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith eds., 1996) ("[I]t is imperative that the sequence of
predication-implicitly represented mental states are real sequences executed off-line and
which are relevantly similar to the sequence of mental states in the simulated person. This
means they function as an analogue model.").
178 See, e.g., Alvin I. Goldman, Interpretation Psychologized, in FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: THE
THEORY OF MIND DEBATE, supra note 157, at 74, 89 ("[I]t may well be considered
remarkable that we are able to predict human behavior as well as we do. Is this impressive
success fully accounted for by the simulation theory? Only, I think, with an added
assumption, viz., that the other people, whose behavior we predict, are psychologically very
similar to ourselves."); Pemer, supra note 177, at 93 ("The critical condition for [simulation]
having any chance of success is that it exploits (wittingly or not) the fact that one's own
psychological make-up is relevantly similar to the make-up of the person simulated.").
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circumstances that led to the defendant's crime; no adjustments to "the
process or mechanism driving the simulation" will be required.
As we will see, such natural similarity is likely the exception, not the
rule. In most cases, because jurors and the defendant will be very
sociologically different, they will be very psychologically different, as well.
To mindread accurately, therefore, jurors will normally have to adjust the
simulation process to eliminate--or at least minimize-those psychological
differences, thereby creating what we might call constructed similarity.179
1. Natural Similarity
A complete account of the sociological differences between jurors and
defendants is beyond the scope of this Article. Significant differences
clearly exist, however, as a result of problems with jury-selection
procedures180  and the sociologically-specific use of peremptory
challenges. 18  Jurors are disproportionately middle-aged, middle-class,
white, 82  and female.183  Criminal defendants, by contrast, are
disproportionately "young, poor, of color,"'184 and male. 85 In seventeen
trials involving black male defendants held in Champaign County, Illinois,
179 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 157, at 63 ("As in the case of hypothetical self-
prediction, the methodology essentially involves deciding what to do; but, extended to
people of 'minds' different from one's own, this not the same as deciding what I myself
would do. One tries to make adjustments for relevant differences." (emphasis omitted));
Van Boven & Loewenstein, supra note 73, at 45 ("[P]erspective taking requires the
realization and anticipation that because other people are in a different situation than the
self-whether that difference concerns expertise, bodily drives, or emotional reactions-they
will think and feel differently than the self.").
180 See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Means and Ends of Representative Juries, 1 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 445, 451-61 (1994).
181 See, e.g., Shaun L. Gabbidon et al., Race-Based Peremptory Challenges: An
Empirical Analysis of Litigation from the U.S. Court ofAppeals, 2002-2006, 33 AM. J. CRIM.
JUST. 59 (2008).
182 See Brown, supra note 180, at 446 (noting that "racial and ethnic minorities, as well
as the young, old, and poor, are constantly underrepresented in most federal and state court
jury pools and wheels").
183 See, e.g., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CHAMPAIGN COUNTY & UNIV. OF ILL.
COLLEGE OF LAW, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY COURTWATCHING PROJECT HIGHLIGHTS: THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007 (2007) (noting that in Champaign County, women were
significantly overrepresented on federal and state juries).
184 Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane
Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 111, 172 (2007); see also
CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1
(2000) (noting that "[a]bout 80% of all criminal defendants are poor").
185 See, e.g., LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CHAMPAIGN COUNTY & UNIV. OF ILL.
COLLEGE OF LAW, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY COURTWATCHING PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS: SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006 (2006) (noting that in 2005, 93% of defendants in Champaign
County federal and state courts were male).
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for example, only 4 out of 252 jurors and alternates were black men and
only 10 out of 252 were black women.
8 6
These sociological differences would not matter if there was no causal
relationship between an individual's psychology and his race, gender,
nationality, and so on. But that is clearly not the case: the empirical
literature is legion with examples of what Kim Lane Scheppele has called
the "perceptual fault lines that occur at the boundaries between social
groups, between whites and people of color, between the privileged and the
poor, between men and women"' 87 -fault lines that have a dramatic impact
on how jurors assess defendants' culpability. White jurors, for example, are
more likely to convict black defendants than white defendants, are more
likely to convict a defendant whose victim was white than a defendant
whose victim was a minority, and tend to punish black defendants more
severely.18 8 Wealthy jurors are more likely to convict than poor jurors, and
jurors are generally more likely to convict a defendant from a different
socioeconomic class than a defendant from their own class, a bias that
magnifies as the disparity between the juror's and the defendant's
socioeconomic class increases. 8 9 And female jurors are more conviction-
prone than male jurors in rape and incest cases, but are generally more
lenient toward defendants in cases that don't involve sex.190
At least some of these differences likely result from the effect of
sociological differences on mindreading. We saw earlier that Chinese
graduate students were far more willing than their American counterparts to
attribute a defendant's decision to kill to situational pressures.1 91 A number
186 LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CHAMPAIGN COUNTY & UNIV. OF ILL. COLLEGE OF
LAW, REPORT ON THE 2004-2005 PILOT PHASE OF THE CHAMPAIGN COUNTY COURTWATCHING
PROJECT 2 (2005).
187 Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2083
(1989).
188 Heller, supra note 173, at 50.
189 Id. at 50-51.
190 Id. at 50.
191 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. This situation-disposition split applies
to Western and Eastern cultures in general. See, e.g., Fiona Lee et al., Explaining Real-Life
Events: How Culture and Domain Shape Attributions, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
732, 733 (1996) ("Numerous studies have found that people from Western cultures tend to
make more dispositional attributions, whereas people from Eastern cultures tend to make
more situational attributions."). The situation-disposition split has even been found within
Western cultures. See, e.g., Angeline Lillard, Developing a Theory of Mind: The CIAO
Approach, 18 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 57, 59 (1999) ("The urban children
used psychological explanations frequently and early; about 60% of their explanations for
others' good and bad behaviors were psychological even at age 7 .... In contrast, the rural
children averaged only 20% psychological explanations, and instead used mostly situational
explanations.").
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of cross-cultural mindreading studies have reached similar conclusions.
Hamilton and Sanders, for example, found that Americans were more likely
than Japanese to view a defendant's criminal act as intentional instead of as
negligent.' 92  Similarly, a study by Levinson found that "Chinese
consistently made higher state of mind judgments than Americans,
including judgments of extreme recklessness, intent to kill, purpose to kill,
knowledge, and deliberation."
'1 93
It is not difficult to see how these psychological differences could
undermine accurate projection. Consider, for example, a case in which a
white juror is faced with an Asian defendant who is arguing subjective
entrapment, a defense that depends on whether the defendant's criminal act
is attributable to his predisposition to commit the crime or to the irresistible
nature of the government agent's inducement. 194  As we have seen,
projection research indicates that because whites are more likely than
Asians to view their own actions as dispositionally caused, whites are
generally more willing than Asians to see the actions of others as
dispositionally caused. The white juror who uses projection to mindread
the Asian defendant is thus likely to make an inaccurate mental-state
attribution: whereas the white juror will likely view the defendant's act as
dispositionally caused, the Asian defendant will likely view his act as
caused by the government agent's inducement-he will not see himself as
having been subjectively predisposed to commit the crime.
This does not mean that the white juror is doomed to misread the
Asian defendant's mental state. It simply means that there is no natural
similarity between the juror and the defendant that can guarantee accurate
projection. Constructed similarity may still be possible: the white juror
may be able to adjust his simulation of the defendant's experience to
eliminate the perceptual gap that exists between them. To the possibility of
such adjustment we now turn.
2. Constructed Similarity
Constructed similarity has two prerequisites. First, the juror must
prevent his own idiosyncratic desires and beliefs and knowledge from
influencing his simulation of the defendant's experience, a process that
Goldman calls "quarantining." '1 95 If he does not quarantine his desires and
beliefs and knowledge, the simulation routine will reveal what mental state
192 See V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE 109 (1992).
193 Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore
Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49 How. L.J. 1, 21 (2005).
194 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
195 GOLDMAN, supra note 50, at 29.
KEVIN JON HELLER
he would have had in the defendant's situation, not what mental state the
defendant actually had. Second, as noted above, the juror must adjust his
simulation routine to take into account the defendant's psychological
differences. If he does not make the necessary adjustments, the simulation
will once again reveal his mental state, not the defendant's. 196 "Pretend
inputs," in short, "can be inaccurate in two ways, through either an excess
or a deficiency of inputs."'
197
a. Excess of Inputs
The fundamental problem with projection, at least in terms of
constructed similarity, is that individuals simply don't quarantine
effectively. The goal of quarantining is to allow the juror to recognize that
the mindreading target may have very different thoughts, feelings, and
knowledge than he does. It is this ideational space that makes it possible
for the mindreader to subsequently adjust his simulation routine to take
those differences into account. 198  Unfortunately, as noted earlier,
mindreaders rarely acknowledge psychological difference; on the contrary,
they assume that others "think, feel, and behave as they themselves do"
even "when they are asked not to" and "regardless of information they have
about other individuals."' 99
Even worse, research indicates that this stubborn egocentrism is at its
apex when the target's behavior is ambiguous-the normal situation in a
criminal case that focuses on the defendant's mental state.200 Lenton and
her colleagues, for example, have found that both men and women are
particularly likely to project their own sexual intent onto others when
others' sexual intent is uncertain.20' More generally, Green and Sedikides
have shown that "the influence of self-schemas is pervasive when the
target's personality characteristics are ambiguous.' 20 2 Neither finding is
surprising: "[i]f one has no direct knowledge of what another.., does or
does not know, and little or no knowledge that would provide the basis for
196 Id. at 29.
1 Id. at 172.
198 Cf id. at 165 ("[W]e can profitably understand projection in terms of a quarantine-
violating simulation process in which the quarantine violation strongly affects, or
contaminates, the resulting attribution .... This results in an attribution that is
inappropriately influenced by the attributor's own current states (genuine, nonpretend
states).").
199 Clement & Krueger, supra note 72, at 219.
200 See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
201 See Lenton et al., supra note 84, at 984.
202 Jeffrey D. Green & Constantine Sedikides, When Do Self-Schemas Shape Social
Projection?: The Role of Descriptive Ambiguity, 25 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 67, 80 (2001).
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making inferences in this regard, the only thing left to do is to use one's
own knowledge as a default assumption as to what the other knows. 20 3
The quarantining failure that underlies egocentrism leads to a number
of important mindreading errors. Empathy gaps, mentioned earlier, are one
example:
A growing body of evidence indicates that people in one emotional situation
project their current preferences and behaviors onto their predictions of how they
would respond in a different emotional situation. Specifically, when people are not
emotionally aroused, they underestimate the impact of emotional arousal on their own
preferences and behaviors. However, when people are emotionally aroused, they
overestimate how much their preferences and behaviors in an unemotional situation
state would resemble their current reactions.
20 4
It is easy to see how empathy gaps could lead to inaccurate juror
mindreading. The kinds of mental states at issue in criminal trials are
quintessentially hot: heat of passion, insanity, duress, etc. Yet jurors in
criminal trials are almost by definition in cold emotional states. Jurors
should thus systematically underestimate the extent to which a defendant's
act might have been influenced by emotion, imputing to the defendant a
degree of rational calculation that he simply did not possess. Indeed,
empathy gaps occur precisely because "people believe that their preferences
and decisions are based primarily on the inherent desirability of choice
alternatives rather than affectively influenced constructions of those
alternatives. 205
Consider, for example, an acquaintance rape case in which the
defendant claims that the sex was consensual and the victim admits to
having passionately kissed the defendant. That defense20 6 requires jurors to
determine how sexually aroused the victim was prior to the intercourse: did
she want to have intercourse with the defendant, or did she want to stop
with kissing? Because sexual arousal is a hot emotional state, cold jurors
may well underestimate the potential effect of the consensual kissing on her
overall level of sexual arousal-which means that they will be more likely
to conclude that although she consented to the kissing, she would not have
consented to the intercourse.
203 Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know-and Sometimes Misjudge-What Others
Know: Imputing One's Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 745 (1999).
204 Van Boven & Loewenstein, supra note 73, at 49.
205 Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Empathy Gaps in Emotional Perspective
Taking, in OTHER MINDS: How HUMANS BRIDGE THE DIVIDE BETWEEN SELF AND OTHERS,
supra note 54, at 284, 289 (citation omitted).
206 Because nonconsent is an element of the crime in nearly every state, consent is
technically a failure of proof defense, not an affirmative defense. See Paul H. Robinson,
Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 199, 208 (1982).
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The acquaintance rape case also requires jurors to mindread the
defendant. How sexually desirous was he? Enough to force the victim to
have intercourse if she wanted to stop with kissing? Here, too, empathy
gaps may lead to inaccurate mindreading: cold jurors are likely to
underestimate the level of force the defendant was willing to use to get what
he wanted. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that they do precisely
that.
207
The curse of knowledge is another mindreading error caused by the
failure to quarantine. The curse refers to individuals' persistent tendency to
let their knowledge interfere with their attempts to simulate others whom
they know are less knowledgeable.08 Numerous studies have demonstrated
the existence of such curses, 20 9 including the financial forecasting
experiment discussed earlier.
The existence of curses of knowledge has profound and unsettling
implications for projection-based jury mindreading. Consider, for example,
the classic mistake-of-fact defense in which a hunter claims that he cannot
be convicted of murder because he honestly believed that his quarry was an
animal, not a person. That defense depends on jurors' assessment of the
hunter's knowledge when he pulled the trigger. Did he honestly believe he
was shooting at an animal (in which case he must be acquitted, because the
mistake negatives any subjective mens rea), or did he know full well the
target was a person (in which case he should be convicted)? If the jurors
fall prey to the curse of knowledge, they may well allow their ex post
knowledge that the target was a person, not an animal, to contaminate their
ex ante simulations of the defendant's perceptions immediately prior to the
shooting, increasing the likelihood that they will conclude the defendant is
lying.
Similar examples could be multiplied indefinitely, because all
subjective mental states require jurors to assess the defendant's knowledge
207 See George Loewenstein et al., The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of
Sexual Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 463 (1997) ("[I]ndividuals who
were sexually aroused were more likely to imagine that they would behave in a sexually
forceful manner on a date. The effect is evident not only in the comparison between the
immediate-arousal and no-arousal conditions but also in the low anticipated levels of
forcefulness in the prior-arousal condition."). Loewenstein's study focused on self-
predictions, not social predictions. But as Van Boven and Loewenstein point out-and as
indicated by projection research generally-"people in one emotional situation should
project their current preferences and behaviors onto other people who are in different
emotional situations." Van Boven & Loewenstein, supra note 73, at 49.
208 See, e.g., Nickerson, supra note 203, at 747 ("[T]he results from some studies suggest
that people often overimpute their own knowledge to others; that is, they find it easy to
impute to other people knowledge that they themselves have but others do not.").
209 See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 50, at 166 (citing studies); Van Boven &
Loewenstein, supra note 73, at 48 (citing studies).
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at the time of the crime. A defendant only acts "recklessly," for example, if
"he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. 2 10  Similarly,
"willful blindness" exists "where it can almost be said that the defendant
actually knew," such as when the defendant "has his suspicion aroused but
then deliberately omits to make further inquiries, because he wishes to
remain in ignorance.,' 211 Even "objective" mens rea requirements often
involve knowledge determinations. As noted earlier, the MPC's influential
definition of negligence requires jurors to assess the risk overlooked by the
defendant in light of "circumstances known to him,, 212 and many
jurisdictions use subjectivized reasonableness standards that require the
reasonableness of the defendant's act to be assessed "seeing what (s)he sees
and knowing what (s)he knows."
'2 13
Indeed, criminal trials seem uniquely subject to the distorting effects of
the curse of knowledge. Jurors who are asked to make knowledge
determinations generally have at least a reasonably complete picture of the
circumstances that actually existed at the time of the crime; the question
they have to answer is how much less the defendant might have known-a
determination that requires them to quarantine their knowledge of the "true"
facts. Yet that is precisely the kind of quarantining that the curse of
knowledge suggests is rarely cognitively possible.
b. Deficiency of Inputs
Even if jurors are able to quarantine their own idiosyncratic desires,
beliefs, and knowledge from the projection process, they will still only be
able to mindread accurately if they adjust their simulation routines to take
into account the defendant's idiosyncratic desires, beliefs, and knowledge.
Such adjustment, which represents the theoretical component of
projection,2 14 requires jurors to complete two very different cognitive acts:
(1) recognizing the need to adjust their simulations, and (2) actually making
the necessary adjustments.
With regard to the first issue, it is clear that jurors do not always
recognize the need to adjust their simulations.215 Consider, for example, the
mistake study discussed earlier. Finkel and his colleagues designed the
210 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
211 WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 159.
212 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(d).
213 State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 557 (Wash. 1977) (citing State v. Dunning, 506 P.2d
321, 322 (Wash. 1973)).
214 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
215 See Goldman, supra note 178, at 83 ("People may not always take such factors into
account.").
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study to determine whether mock jurors would be willing to "enter the
defendant's subjectivity completely" and acquit him regardless of the
implausibility of his mistake-all four scenarios indicated that the subway
vigilante honestly believed that he was about to be killed.216 As it turned
out, they weren't: Finkel and his colleagues found that "[m]istake of fact
works to lower culpability, but this mitigating effect depends on how
believable or reasonable the mistake is and whether reasonable effort was
made ... despite the mistake. ,217  Those findings indicate that instead of
recognizing the need to take the defendant's psychological differences into
account when they simulated his perceptions of the four self-defensive
situations, jurors simply asked whether they-an unadjusted they-would
have made the same mistakes. Hence the more implausible the mistake, the
less willing they were to acquit.
Despite the mistake study, it seems clear that jurors who mindread
through projection will usually recognize the need to take the defendant's
psychological differences into account. That is the conclusion Epley and
his colleagues drew from a series of projection experiments they conducted:
Initially, people anchor on their own perspective, presumably because it is often
highly accessible. In the absence of clear evidence that another person will see the
world differently, perspective taking ends there with people assuming that others will
perceive the world as they do. However, when others are known to be in different
situations, from different backgrounds, or in possession of different knowledge, such
naive realism is simply untenable. In these cases, as in the experiments reported in
this article, it is clear from the outset that one's own perspective is not shared and
adjustment is required.
2 18
The critical question, then, is whether jurors can actually make the
necessary adjustments to their egocentric simulations. Here Epley and his
colleagues are more skeptical. Their research suggests that individuals
project through an "anchor-and-adjust" process in which they "jump"
further away from their own perspective until they reach a plausible
reconstruction of the target's perspective.21 9 The problem is that, although
the process reduces egocentrism, 220 mindreaders rarely jump far enough:
216 Norman J. Finkel & Jennifer L. Groscup, When Mistakes Happen: Commonsense
Rules of Culpability, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 65, 79 (1997). The defendant was not
charged with negligent homicide, so even an honest but unreasonable mistake legally
entitled him to an acquittal.
217 Id. at 92.
218 Epley et al., supra note 68, at 337 (citation omitted); see also Van Boven &
Loewenstein, supra note 73, at 45 ("Mature adults typically realize that other people who are
in a different situation may have beliefs, perceptions, preferences, and behavioral
inclinations that differ from their own.").
219 Epley et al., supra note 68, at 337; cf Hans Herbert Kogler, Empathy, Dialogical Self,
and Reflexive Interpretation: The Symbolic Source of Stimulation, in EMPATHY AND
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Although the anchoring and adjustment heuristic is clearly useful, the adjustments
made from one's own perspective... tend to be insufficient-and give rise to
egocentric biases-because they terminate once a plausible estimate is reached. This
"satisficing" produces responses biased toward the egocentric side of the distribution
of plausible estimates.
2 2 1
This conclusion is also supported by jury decision-making research.
Haney and Sweeney, for example, conducted a "simulation study of race
and death sentencing" to determine why white jurors are far more likely to
sentence black defendants to death than white defendants-an effect found
in numerous death-penalty studies.222 They found that white mock jurors
''were significantly less willing or able to verbalize the reasons for their
verdict choices" when the defendant and the victim were both black,
referred more often and more positively to mitigating circumstances when
the defendant was white, were far less likely to consider previous drug use
to be a mitigating factor when the defendant was black, and were more
likely to cite the absence of a criminal record as a reason for mercy when
the defendant was white.223  According to Haney, "[t]his suggests the
racially discriminatory pattern of death sentencing may be a function of
jurors' inability to empathize with or enter the subjective world
of... defendants who are racially different from them." 224  That
explanation is consistent with the anchor-and-adjust process, which would
predict that white jurors would find it much easier to adjust their egocentric
anchors to simulate the subjective perceptions of a sociologically similar
defendant than a sociologically dissimilar one. As Harris says, "[t]he gist
of the account is that simulation is more or less difficult depending on the
number of adjustments that have to be made in default settings.' 225
The problem is that jurors simply have no reliable method for
determining how sociological differences translate into psychological
differences, and thus have no reliable method for distinguishing between
226plausible and implausible adjustments. How does a white juror
AGENCY: THE PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 194, 213 (Hans
Herbert K6gler & Karsten R. Stueber eds., 2000) ("In order to begin the interpretive process,
we have to project, of course, some understanding (naturally our own) onto the other's
expression and behavior. Yet such an interpretive projection can be nothing but a
bridgehead into the other's perspective, which needs to be continuously checked, revised,
reassessed, and replaced as the interpretive process unfolds.").
220 Epley et al., supra note 68, at 337.
221 Id. at 328 (citation omitted).
222 See Haney, supra note 97, at 330.
223 Id. at 331.
224 Id.
225 Harris, supra note 177, at 214.
226 See Goldman, supra note 178, at 83 (noting that individuals "frequently ... lack
information to make adjustments").
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determine how the defendant's "blackness" affects his perceptions? How
does a man determine how a battered woman would perceive a threatening
situation? This is, of course, "the classic hermeneutic challenge[,] '" 227 and
there is no evidence that jurors can overcome it. On the contrary, "we have
to understand that the holistic and culturally, socially, and historically
impregnated nature of the background [of another] rules out any class or




How, then, does a juror determine what adjustments he needs to make
to his egocentric simulation of the defendant's situation? The most likely
answer-through stereotypes of how different races, genders, etc. perceive
21and act in crime-related situations-is cause for concern.29 Such
stereotypes are all too common-blacks are violent, aggressive, and
hostile;230 women who dress provocatively want to have sex; 23' and so on.
Stereotypes of that sort are almost always inaccurate; jurors that use them to
adjust their simulations are likely to make even less accurate mental-state
attributions than jurors who do not adjust their simulations at all. Natural
similarity between jurors and defendants may be a myth, but there is no
question that different sociological groups are more similar than stereotypes
suggest.
This explanation presumes, of course, that jurors who adjust their
simulations through stereotypes do not see the defendant as so dissimilar
that projection is no longer possible. Adjustment has its limits: "it is
reasonable to assume that people engage in such anchoring and adjustment
only when it is clear that one's self is a reasonable starting place in
estimating others' perspectives. In situations where one's own perspective
is clearly irrelevant, [a] quite different process[] may be involved., 232 That
process is prototyping, to which we now turn.
227 Kogler, supra note 219, at 201.
228 Id. at 213.
229 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 157, at 65-66 (suggesting that when an individual
attempts to simulate the perceptions of someone from an "alien culture," he may begin with
"a stereotypic set of adjustments").
230 Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of
Race and Stereotypes, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 375, 380 (1997).
231 Malgorzata Wysocka-Pleczyk, Victims of Violence: Stereotypes and the Process of
Helping, in UNDERSTANDING PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGY 199, 203 (Przemyslaw
Piotrowski ed. 2006).
232 Epley et al., supra note 68, at 337.
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B. THE ERRORS OF PROTOTYPING
Unfortunately, prototyping is an even more problematic mindreading
technique than projection. First, the features of prototypes rarely
correspond to the legal definitions of particular crimes and defenses.
Second, the fuzzy nature of prototyping is inconsistent with the formal
requirements of jury decision-making. Third, prototypes tilt toward the
extraordinary and unusual, reducing the likelihood that they will match
actual cases. Fourth, prototypes vary significantly between jurors,
undermining consistent decision-making. And fifth, prototyping in general
causes jurors to process evidence in biased ways, leading to inaccurate fact-
finding.
1. Mismatched Elements
One critical problem with prototyping is that the features of "people's
naive representations" '233 often deviate-sometimes substantially-from the
legal elements of particular crimes and defenses. Some of those deviations
focus on the criminal act itself. For example, 73% of the participants in
Smith's classic study of lay prototypes incorrectly believed that robbery
requires the perpetrator to be armed.234 Many deviations, however, focus
on the mental states particular crimes require.
a. Omitted Mens Rea
Some crime prototypes simply don't include a mens rea requirement,
thus implicitly holding the defendant strictly liable for committing the act.
Stalking is an excellent example. As of 1998, forty-six states required
stalking to be conducted either intentionally or purposefully. 235 A prototype
study conducted by Dennison and Thomson, however, found that a stunning
95% of the 540 participants involved in the study classified harassing
behavior2 36 as stalking even when they believed "that the accused did not
intend to cause fear or harm to the target.,
237
233 Smith, supra note 102, at 509; see also Cantor et al., supra note 103, at 46-47
("[K]nowledge about any given category is structured around, and represented in long-term
memory as, a prototype which captures the meaning of the category .... [A prototype may
take the form of] an abstract set of features commonly associated with members of a
category, with each feature assigned a weight according to degree of association with the
category.").
234 Smith, supra note 104, at 861 tbl.1. Robbery actually requires only violence or
intimidation. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (8th ed. 2004) (defining robbery).
Smith's mock jurors conflated robbery and armed robbery.
235 See Susan M. Dennison & Donald M. Thomson, Identifying Stalking: The Relevance
ofIntent in Commonsense Reasoning, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 543, 544 (2002).
236 Harassing behavior includes persistent following, making phone calls and hanging up,
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Many of the crime prototypes in Smith's study are similarly deficient.
Although assault requires the victim to have "a reasonable apprehension of
imminent harmful or offensive contact," 238 none of the assault prototypes
held by mock jurors included that, or any other, mens rea.239 Only 33% of
their burglary prototypes included burglary's requirement24° that the
perpetrator intend to commit a felony.241 Less than half of their murder
prototypes contained any kind of intent requirement at all.242
b. Incorrect Mens Rea
Other crime prototypes contain a different flaw: they contain a mens
rea requirement, but not the one legally required by the crime. Five percent
of the participants in Dennison and Thomson's study, for example,
recognized that stalking required mens rea. Unfortunately, all but one of
that five percent (99.6%) believed that a defendant was guilty of stalking if
he "should have realised that his actions were likely to create fear or
apprehension in the target"243-a simple negligence standard.
Jurors also often make an even more problematic mistake: substituting
motive for intent. The prosecution is never required to prove that the
defendant had a motive for the crime; 244 a killer who intentionally kills for
no reason is still guilty of murder. Nevertheless, Finkel and Groscup have
found that juror prototypes for burglary, kidnapping, rape, and murder
overwhelmingly emphasize motive245 : motive not only "most dramatically
differentiates the not guilty from the guilty, '246 "when no ... motive can be
found, and particularly no guilty motive, then the prosecution's case
collapses. 247 A similar transposition of mental elements occurs in insanity
cases that involve a male defendant who kills a male stranger: "it is neither
the criminal act, the precipitating event, nor even the defendant's
psychiatric history that differentiates successful from unsuccessful
outcomes, but motive. 48
watching the victim's house, etc. See Dennison & Thomson, supra note 109, at 165.
237 Id. at 166.
238 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 234, at 122 (defining assault).
239 Smith, supra note 104, at 861 tbl.1.
240 id.
241 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 234, at 211 (defining burglary).
242 Smith, supra note 104, at 861 tbl.1.
243 Dennison & Thomson, supra note 109, at 167.
244 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 128 (2008).
245 Finkel & Groscup, supra note 110, at 224.
246 id.
247 Id. at 225.
248 Id. at 219.
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c. Redefined Mens Rea
Finally, some prototypes include the "correct" mens rea, but
understand that mental state in a legally inappropriate manner. The insanity
defense is perhaps the best example: numerous studies have shown that
"jurors construe case facts and render verdicts" on the basis of "complex,
multifaceted prototypes of insanity that cannot be reduced to legal tests of
insanity or to psychiatric diagnoses. 24 9 Skeem and Golding have found,
for example, that jurors generally possess one of three basic insanity
prototypes: a "severe mental disability" prototype, which involves "a
peculiar blend of psychosis and intellectual impairment" that renders the
insane defendant little more than a "wild beast" (47%);250 a "moral
insanity" prototype, which "conflates characteristics of psychopathy and
psychosis to represent a malevolent, detached, irrational, and unpredictably
violent offender" (33%);251 and a "mental-state centered" prototype, which
focuses almost exclusively on impairments in the defendant's mental state
at the time of the crime (21%).52 All three prototypes strongly influence
jurors' willingness to find a defendant insane, 253 but only the third-held by
little more than one in five jurors-is consistent with the current legal
definition of insanity.
254
Self-defense's objective reasonableness requirement is another
example of an often-redefined mens rea. As mentioned earlier, Russell and
Melillo's prototype study found that jurors were much more likely to acquit
a "typical" battered woman than an "atypical" battered woman, even when
the situation was objectively the same. 255 The reason why is revealing-
jurors simply perceived the defendant's act as more objectively reasonable
when they considered her to be a typical battered woman:
Typical defendants were perceived to have more options available .... In contrast,
respondents rated typical defendants as more likely to meet the requirements of self-
defense. Respondents in passive conditions also perceived the defendant as having
fewer options to killing and were most likely to find a fit with the typology of a
249 Skeem & Golding, supra note 117, at 604.
250 Id. at 593, 605; see also Roberts et al., supra note 138, at 222-23 (reporting that in
their study of insanity prototypes, "bizarre crimes were perceived as indicating more mental
disorder").
251 Skeem & Golding, supra note 117, at 601.
252 Id. at 595, 601.
253 Id. at 604.
254 Id. at 604-05; see also Roberts et al., supra note 138, at 222-23 ("Case law cautions
that bizarre and heinous actions should not be construed as an indication of either mental
illness or insanity.").
255 Russell & Melillo, supra note 135, at 234 ("[P]articipants in atypical/active
conditions were more likely to assign judgments of second-degree murder, whereas those in
typical/passive conditions most often rendered not-guilty verdicts.").
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battered woman .... Typicality and response history also resulted in case effects.
Respondents in passive conditions found the defendant was more likely to meet the
requirements of self-defense [and] was more likely to fit the typology of a battered256
woman ....
Jurors' personological prototypes for battered women, in other words,
naturally257 include a "subjectivized" reasonableness standard that views the
reasonableness of the woman's act from her subjective perspective-
"seeing what (s)he sees and knowing what (s)he knows." That prototype
would be legally accurate in the bare majority of states that use a
subjectivized self-defense standard,258 but would be inaccurate everywhere
else.
2. Fuzzy Prototyping
The disjunction between the features of prototypes and the legal
elements of crimes and defenses is only part of the problem. Jurors also do
not view prototype features as "singly necessary and jointly sufficient" for
conviction: if the characteristics of the defendant's crime match the features
of the prototype closely enough, jurors will convict even in the absence of
one (or more) of the features, 259 a basic violation of due process.
26 °
This typicality effect can easily lead to inaccurate mental-state
attributions. Most important, it leaves open the possibility that a juror will
convict a defendant whose criminal act closely matches his prototype for
that kind of crime even if the defendant did not possess the necessary mens
rea. Finkel and Groscup have found, for example, that although jurors will
"usually" acquit a burglary defendant who breaks into a house he
previously occupied to retrieve forgotten belongings, some jurors will still
convict.261 Such convictions are legally indefensible, because a defendant
cannot intend to steal his own possessions. But they make sense as an
artifact of prototyping. Although the "misunderstood burglar" 262 scenario
does not match the mental element of the most common burglary prototype
("purpose is to steal"), it matches all three of that prototype's physical
elements (a break-in, a house or apartment, the taking of something
valuable).263 The misunderstood burglar scenario is thus typical enough-
at least for the jurors who convict-to warrant being considered burglary.
256 id.
257 The jury instructions used in the experiment contained a purely objective standard.
258 For a state-by-state background current to 1998, see Heller, supra note 173, app.
259 See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
260 See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
261 See Finkel & Groscup, supra note 110, at 223.
262 The term is Finkel & Groscup's. See id.
263 See Smith, supra note 104, at 861 tbl.1.
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Typicality led to a similar error in Smith's study of murder prototypes.
Smith presented mock jurors with a murder scenario in which the defendant
intentionally induced a fatal heart attack in the victim by holding him in
front of an oncoming train, knowing that the victim had a heart condition.
64
The scenario legally qualified as murder, and most jurors had little problem
categorizing it as such.265 Smith then presented different mock jurors with a
version of the scenario in which it was impossible to find that the defendant
acted with the necessary intent, because the defendant did not know about
the victim's heart. Despite the legal insufficiency of the new scenario, 26%
of the jurors were still willing to convict.266 Smith thus concluded that
although intentionality is a "relatively important" feature of most jurors'
murder prototypes, it is not a necessary one-jurors will overlook it if a
killing is otherwise sufficiently prototypical.267
Even if jurors do not completely ignore mens rea, the typicality effect
can lead them to discount its importance. An experiment conducted by
Follingstad and her colleagues asked mock jurors to judge three scenarios in
which a battered woman killed her husband and claimed self-defense. 68
The scenarios were designed to test the jurors' willingness to view the
woman's actions as objectively reasonable: in Scenario 1, the husband
advanced on the woman with a weapon, and she used a weapon to kill him;
in Scenario 2, the woman killed her husband after he advanced toward her,
unarmed but making verbal threats; in Scenario 3, the husband beat and
verbally threatened the woman, but she waited until he was asleep to kill
him.269 The results were surprising: although the jurors were far more
likely to acquit the defendant in Scenario 1 than in Scenarios 2 and 3, nearly
half of the jurors still acquitted her in the latter two scenarios-and there
was no significant difference between them.270
The results are legally inexplicable; if the mock jurors had interpreted
self-defense's imminence requirement "in a strictly objective fashion,"
Scenario 3 would have led to far fewer acquittals than Scenario 2.271 The
results make perfect sense, however, if the jurors determined whether to
convict by matching the characteristics of the defendant's act to their
264 Id. app. B (presenting murder).
265 Id. at 867. Note, though, that 33% of the jurors still refused to convict, indicating that
their murder prototypes did not track the legal definition of murder. Id.
266 id.
267 Id.
268 Diane R. Follingstad et al., Factors Predicting Verdicts in Cases Where Battered
Women Kill Their Husbands, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 259 (1989).
269 id.
270 Id. at 266.
271 See FINKEL, supra note 28, at 243.
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prototypes of what the "typical" battered-woman self-defense situation
looks like. The 50% of mock jurors who acquitted the defendant in
Scenario 3, that is, might simply have viewed the circumstances of the
crime-the husband's violent history, the beating itself, the verbal
threatening, etc.-as so typical of a legitimate defensive act by a battered
woman that the objective unreasonableness of the woman's belief regarding
imminence did not affect their categorization of the killing as self-defense.
The typicality effect can also go the other direction: if a juror finds that
the defendant acted with the mental state associated with the prototype of a
particular crime, he may convict even if the defendant's act does not
otherwise satisfy the crime's legal requirements. That is exactly what
happened when Smith presented jurors with a robbery scenario in which the
defendant took a cassette recorder he found in a park next to a tree.272 The
scenario did not legally qualify as robbery, because the defendant did not
take the property from the owner by force or threat of force. Nevertheless,
the scenario produced an 87% conviction rate, indicating that jurors so
strongly associate2 73 the intentional taking of property with robbery that the
presence of intentional taking will trump the absence of the crime's
physical elements.274
3. Extraordinary Prototypes
We have seen that, when a juror mindreads through prototyping,
mental-state attributions are a function of the degree to which the
defendant's act matches a juror's prototype for a particular crime or
defense: if the match is strong enough, the juror will attribute the mental
state associated with the prototype to the defendant.27 5 That explanation
raises a critical question, one that I have largely glossed over to this point: if
matching involves a comparison between the content of a prototype and the
nature of the defendant's act, what do we mean when talk about a
prototype's "content"? Are prototypes "pictures in the head," to
appropriate Walter Lippman's classic description of stereotypes? 276 Are
272 Smith, supra note 104, app. B (presenting robbery).
273 See Cantor et al., supra note 103, at 47 (noting that each prototypical feature is
"assigned a weight according to degree of association with the category").
274 Smith, supra note 104, at 867. This result cannot be explained by arguing that the
mock jurors who convicted did not know about the other elements; 73% of the participants
in an earlier experiment in Smith's study listed force or the threat of force as a feature of
robbery. See id. at 861 tbl.1.
275 See, e.g., Skeem & Golding, supra note 117, at 569 ("The more closely the
defendant's attributes match those of her prototype, the more likely she is to judge that
defendant a member of the category 'insane."').
276 WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 25 (1922).
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they abstract sets of features, with no representational aspects? Or are they
a combination of the two?
The answer is that it depends on the prototype. Some prototypes are, in
fact, nothing more than "pictures in the head"-visual exemplars of what
the typical crime or defense "looks like." The prototypic assault, for
example, is simply a physical attack in which the victim is injured.
Matching that kind of prototype is thus a wholly imaginative process in
which the juror accesses the visual prototype and compares it to the image
of the defendant's act that he has generated from the evidence in the case.
2 77
No theoretical comparison is required between the prototype and the act,
because the prototype does not contain any abstract features.
But what about mental states? They are inherently abstract; you can't
see a mental state. So doesn't a juror have to engage in theoretical
reasoning to determine whether the defendant acted with the necessary
mens rea?
There are two responses to that question. The first is that it is often
moot, because some juror prototypes simply do not contain a mental
element. 278 The more complicated response is that, when a purely visual
prototype "contains" a mental element, the necessary mental state is
represented as a particular kind of action. Many juror prototypes of
consent in rape cases, for example, represent the mental state of "consent"
as the absence of physical or verbal resistance to sex.2 79 Similarly, many
juror prototypes of insanity equate the mental state of being insane with
looking and acting bizarrely. 280 With these kinds of prototypes, action
serves as a proxy for the underlying mental state that (ostensibly) produced
it; certain actions signify certain mental states.
Other prototypes are more complex, involving a combination of visual
images and abstract features. A common prototype of a non-criminal
burglary, for example, involves "a former roommate or ex-spouse
retum[ing] to a house he or she lived in to retrieve some forgotten
belongings., 281 Entering the house and taking the belongings are visual; the
defendant owning the belongings is abstract. Similarly, the prototypical
battered woman is young, fragile, guilt-ridden, confused, and depressed;
rarely interacts with others; has children and is financially dependent on her
277 For an explanation of how jurors generate images of the defendant's act, see generally
Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV.
241-305 (2006).
278 See supra notes 235-42 and accompanying text.
279 See Littleton & Axsom, supra note 110, at 474.
280 See Roberts et al., supra note 138, at 222-23.
281 Finkel & Groscup, supra note 110, at 223.
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partner; makes excuses for her partner's behavior; and passively accepts her
abuse. Very few of those features are representational.
When a prototype contains both visual elements and abstract features,
matching will be a hybrid process, both imaginative and theoretical. To
apply the "misunderstood burglar 282 prototype, for example, a juror will
have to both (1) imaginatively compare the "entering the house" and
"taking the belongings" features to the defendant's actions, and (2)
theoretically compare the "ownership" feature to the evidence presented in
the case-were the belongings really his? Similarly, to determine whether
the defendant is a battered woman, a juror will visually compare the
representational features of his "battered" prototype to the defendant's
appearance (young, trying to hide injuries, depressed, etc.) and theoretically
compare the non-representational features to the evidence in the case (rarely
interacts with others, financially dependent, makes excuses, etc.).
Mindreading through complex prototypes can involve either visual
proxies or theoretical comparison. Consider what Finkel calls the
"benevolent burglar" prototype: a poor defendant who steals food and
medicine from a store because his children are sick and need to eat.283 That
prototype is a visual/abstract hybrid: the defendant stealing the items is
visual; the defendant's motive (to take care of his hungry and sick kids) is
abstract. Some jurors may match the defendant's abstract motive through a
visual proxy, interpreting stealing food and medicine (but nothing else) as
signifying a benevolent motive. Other jurors, by contrast, may match that
motive theoretically, by examining whether the evidence in the case
indicates that the defendant's children needed food and medicine.
284
Regardless of whether a prototype is simple or complex, it is the
content of the prototype that drives the matching process. Prototyping can
thus lead to inaccurate mindreading even when the structural features of a
juror's prototype do, in fact, match the legal elements of a crime or defense:
namely, when the prototype's visual or abstract content is so idiosyncratic
that legitimate instances of the particular crime or defense will fail to match
it. Put more simply, prototyping will be inaccurate whenever the juror's
idea of the "typical" crime or defense isn't actually all that typical.
Unfortunately, research indicates that prototypes are rarely
representative of the crime or defense they purport to represent. Finkel and
Groscup, for example, found that "against the backdrop of typical legal
cases and empirical studies of actual euthanasia, insanity, heat of passion,
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 A benevolent motive, of course, does not mean that the defendant lacked the mens rea
of burglary. Finkel and Groscup's research indicates, however, that jurors are nevertheless
likely to acquit the benevolent burglar. Id.
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and self-defense cases, the extraordinary emerges pervasively and
dramatically in the prototypes. 2 85 More specifically, Stalans and Diamond
have concluded that many jurors "have a picture of the typical burglary case
,,286that is more severe than the burglary cases that normally appear in court.
Olsen-Fulero and Fulero found in their study of rape prototypes that
"[v]irtually all participants described a rape by a stranger occurring at night
in a park or parking lot, even though most real rapes occur in a woman's
own home or during a date," suggesting that "a juror's commonsense
schema of rape is very often discrepant from the facts of a given or typical
court case. ,287  And Skeem and Golding have found that the typical
defendant who is acquitted by reason of insanity-a psychotic man with a
psychiatric history who commits a violent crime-matches only 21% of
juror insanity prototypes, suggesting that "many jurors' prototypes of
insanity are prone to convict.
288
The culprit, not surprisingly, is the media: television, the movies, and
the news. "Because a relatively small proportion of the public has direct
experience with the justice system, public knowledge and views of law and
the legal system are largely dependent on media representations. 289 I have
already mentioned Holst and Pezdek's study of robbery prototypes, which
found that nearly 90% of the participants had learned what a typical robbery
looked like from the media.290  Those results are by no means unusual.
When Finkel and Groscup conducted content analyses of the
"extraordinary" prototypes in their study, they found that the prototypes
"reveal[ed] obvious news media, TV, and Hollywood influences, where the
accessibility bias is quite evident.2 9 1  Similarly, Skeem and Golding
attributed the two inaccurate insanity prototypes held by 79% of their
subjects-the "wild beast" prototype (47%) and the "moral insanity"
prototype (32%)-to media representations of insanity.
292
285 Id. at 216.
286 Loretta J. Stalans & Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay
Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing: Misperception and Discontent, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
199, 205 (1990).
287 Olsen-Fulero & Fulero, supra note 81, at 404.
288 Skeem & Golding, supra note 117, at 605; see also Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater,
"Plain Crazy:" Lay Definitions of Legal Insanity, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 105, 111
(1984) ("[I]n defining insanity, some of our respondents insisted on near total lack of
comprehension. Very few, if any, defendants would be able to meet such a strict standard.").
289 Hans, supra note 140, at 399.
290 Holst & Pezdek, supra note 141, at 580.
291 Finkel & Groscup, supra note 110, at 216.
292 See Skeem & Golding, supra note 117, at 592 ("The [Severe Mental Disabilityl's
characteristics are identifiable not only in research, but also in contemporary media and
historical representations of insanity. The news and entertainment media are laypeople's
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4, Prototype Diversity
Prototype diversity exists at two levels. First, an individual juror may
possess multiple prototypes of the same crime or defense. Holst and
Pezdek, for example, have shown that jurors normally have at least three
different robbery prototypes: one for a bank robbery, one for a convenience
store robbery, and one for a mugging.293 Similarly, Wiener and his
colleague's study of murder prototypes found that "[a] careful reading of
the story skeletons ... evidenced multiple (at least three and maybe five)
shared prototypes., 294 Indeed, it even possible-perhaps likely-that jurors
possess "guilty" and "not guilty" versions of each prototype.29 5 Participants
in Finkel and Groscup's prototype study had little difficulty generating
prototypes of burglaries, kidnappings, rapes, and killings in self-defense
that required acquittal.296
This kind of diversity is unproblematic. In fact, it is almost certainly a
good thing, because the existence of multiple prototypes will increase the
likelihood that real-world crimes and defenses will match a particular
prototype. The problem with a single prototype (and particularly an
extraordinary one) is that the gap between the prototype and the set of
legitimate instances of the crime or defense is simply too large: too few
instances will overlap with the prototype enough to qualify as a match.
That gap is obviously much smaller if a juror possesses multiple prototypes
of a particular crime or defense, because more legitimate instances will
match (one of) the prototypes. And that is true even if the multiple
prototypes are themselves skewed toward the extraordinary, which seems
likely.
Prototypes also normally differ between jurors. Skeem and Golding's
study, for example, revealed not only that jurors possess three different
insanity prototypes, but also that "jurors do not substantially agree on even
a subset of the features that characterize insanity.', 297 Such differences are
not accidental; a similar study by Hans and Slater found that "the
demographic variables of education, gender, and race, and television
viewing were all related to the way people defined legal insanity.
298
primary sources of information about psychopathology and the insanity defense."); id. at 594
("Most striking ... is the resemblance of the [Moral Insanity] prototype to the most
persistent, pervasive, and powerful media stereotype of the mentally ill: the psychotic
psychopath." (citations omitted)).
293 Holst & Pezdek, supra note 141, at 578.
294 Wiener et al., supra note 124, at 135.
295 See Finkel & Groscup, supra note 110, at 213.
296 Id. at 225.
297 Skeem & Golding, supra note 117, at 582.
298 Hans & Slater, supra note 288, at 111.
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Crime prototypes also exhibit between-juror differences. Smith's
study of assault, burglary, kidnapping, murder, and robbery,2 99 for example,
found that "[a]cross the five crimes, very few features were listed
consistently by subjects. No feature was listed by all subjects, and only one
or two features for each crime were provided by as many as half of the
subjects."3 " Wiener and his colleagues reached a similar conclusion in
their murder study: "[N]o single- or even multiple-murder story prototypes
emerged. In fact, the amount of variability among the stories on their faces
is striking."
30 '
Finkel and his colleagues' infanticide study provides a particularly
dramatic example of this variability. As noted earlier, mock jurors
generally agreed that beating the baby to death signified premeditation,
while suffocation signified a temporary loss of reason. Their prototypes for
abandonment, however, were very different. Some jurors equated
abandoning the baby in the dumpster with the absence of premeditation,
saying things like "[she] didn't kill," and "the baby could have been found."
Others, however, drew exactly the opposite conclusion; in their view,
because "she took a long walk" and "had time to think and stop," she "had a
plan," was "trying to kill," and acted with "malice" and "premeditation. 3 2
Unlike within-juror diversity, between-juror diversity is problematic.
Juries normally employ one of two different deliberation styles. The first is
"evidence-driven," in which jurors begin by trying to reach a consensus
about what actually happened during the crime and then attempt to agree on
the appropriate verdict for the consensus story. The second is a "verdict-
driven," in which jurors begin by taking a public vote on the defendant's
guilt and then attempt to work out their differences by discussing the
evidence in the case.30 3
Both deliberation styles will be more difficult when jurors bring
different prototypes of the relevant crime or defense into the jury room. A
jury that uses an evidence-driven style will find it particularly difficult to
agree on the appropriate verdict, because the jurors will not be using the
same legal standards to assess the consensus story. Even worse, those
jurors will most likely not even realize they are applying different legal
299 But cf Holst & Pezdek, supra note 141, at 578 (finding, in their study of robbery
prototypes, "a high rate of agreement among subjects for the actions that comprise each type
of robbery").
300 Smith, supra note 104, at 860.
301 Wiener et al., supra note 124, at 129.
302 Finkel et al., supra note 113, at 1129-30.
303 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological
Research on Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 90,
99-100 (1990).
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standards: although the judge will have instructed them on the "correct"
definitions of the relevant crimes or defenses, creating the appearance of
uniformity, their verdict choices will still be determined by their
prototypes. 30 4 As a result, the jury will almost always reach the verdict that
is consistent with whatever prototype happens to be held by the most jurors,
because numerous studies have shown that the best predictor of a jury's
final verdict is the distribution of its initial verdict preferences.
305
A jury that uses a verdict-driven style will have the same problem, but
to an even greater degree. "[W]hen groups begin discussion with a clear
preference, discussion tends to strengthen those opinions-a phenomenon
called 'group polarization."' 30 6 By beginning with a vote, in other words, a
verdict-driven jury will "lock in" the initial distribution of (prototype-
driven) verdicts, making it very unlikely that subsequent discussion of the
evidence in the case will affect verdict preferences. At least with the
evidence-driven jury, the attempt to create a consensus story may affect
how some jurors view the evidence. If it does, the jury's initial distribution
of verdict preferences will likely be different than the verdict-driven jury's,
because a change in how a juror views the evidence in a case can affect a
juror's initial verdict preference. This can happen either by potentially
reducing the match between the evidence and the juror's prototype to the
point that the prototype no longer applies (or vice-versa), or by triggering a
different prototype of the same crime, one that leads to a different verdict
preference.
5. Biased Evidence Processing
The final problem with prototyping is that it will often lead jurors to
inaccurately assess the evidence in a defendant's case. That is a critical
flaw, because inaccurate evidence assessment will then lead to inaccurate
matching--either increasing the likelihood of a false match with the juror's
prototype or decreasing the likelihood of a true match.30 7
304 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 104, at 866 ("These results indicate that hearing the
judge's instructions on the crime definitions did not alter the strategies subjects used to make
their verdict decisions. Typicality still influenced categorization for assault, burglary, and
kidnapping, even when subjects were instructed in the legally correct decision strategy.").
305 See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966) (finding in their
study that the majority pre-deliberation verdict became the final verdict in 209 out of 215
juries, or 97%).
306 NEIL BREWER & KIPLING D. WILLIAMS, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: AN EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVE 368 (2005) (citation omitted).
307 See Vicki L. Smith & Christina A. Studebaker, What Do You Expect?: The Influence
of People's Prior Knowledge of Crime Categories on Fact-Finding, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
517, 529 (1996).
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Two errors are particularly important. A juror who initially believes
that the defendant's act matches his prototype of a particular crime or
defense will likely (1) exhibit a significant confirmation bias in his evidence
assessment, and (2) misremember the evidence presented at trial in ways
that increase the extent of the match, what cognitive psychologists call "gap
filling."
a. The Confirmation Bias
To accurately match evidence to a prototype, a juror must be able to
distinguish objectively between evidence that supports a match and
evidence that does not. Unfortunately, once jurors have reached an initial
conclusion about whether a match exists, they will find it very difficult to
recognize evidence that is inconsistent with that conclusion.30 8 First, they
may limit their search for such evidence, focusing almost exclusively on
evidence that supports the match. 30 9 That is exactly what Jones and Kaplan
found in their study of race-crime prototypes:
A confirmatory strategy is used in examining information about White and Black
defendants charged with a racially congruent crime because the convergence of race
with the crime stereotype suggests a plausible hypothesis of guilt. This hypothesis, in
turn, seems to lead to a greater desire for evidence that confirms it.
310
Second, jurors may ignore questions about the reliability of evidence
that supports the match, a form of the confirmation bias known as "belief
perseverance": the tendency of individuals to "adhere to their beliefs when
the original evidential basis of the beliefs is shown to be flimsy, false, or
nonexistent. 3 11 We have seen, for example, that the existence of a guilty
motive is the most heavily weighted feature of many crime prototypes. A
juror who believes that the defendant had a motive to commit the crime will
thus be very likely to overlook problems with the evidence on which that
belief is based-it is hearsay, the witness who established the motive had
reason to lie, etc. Indeed, research indicates that belief perseverance is
strongest when the discredited evidence is part of a "coherent, causally
related account in which a single or minimal correction has a significant
impact on the construal of meaning. 3 12 That is exactly the situation with a
308 See, e.g., David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional
Effects of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 892, 893 (1993).
309 See, e.g., David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., The Subjective Beliefs Underlying Probability
Overestimation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 276, 278 (1997).
310 Jones & Kaplan, supra note 128, at 10.
311 Martin F. Davies, Belief Persistence After Evidential Discrediting: The Impact of
Generated Versus Provided Explanations on the Likelihood of Discredited Outcomes, 33 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 562 (1997).
312 Hollyn M. Johnson & Colleen M. Seifert, Sources of the Continued Influence Effect:
KEVIN JON HELLER
prototype match involving a heavily weighted feature like motive-
rejecting the match will require rejecting the "coherent, causally related"
prototype itself.
Third, and finally, jurors may interpret ambiguous evidence in a
manner consistent with the prototype match.31 3 For example, if the
evidence strongly, but not definitively, suggests that the defendant did not
have a motive to commit the crime, jurors may give the prosecution the
benefit of the doubt and still assume that the defendant had one.
b. Gap-Filling
Even more troubling, a number of studies have demonstrated that a
prototype match may lead jurors to misremember the evidence presented at
trial, filling gaps in the evidence in ways that are consistent with the
prototype. Holst and Pezdek's study of robbery prototypes is an excellent
example. According to their research, the most common prototype of a
mugging contains the following sequence of acts by the defendant:
" Make a plan.
* Look around.
* Select a victim.
* Wait for an opportunity.
* Approach the victim.
* Use force.
" Take money/valuables.
314* Leave the scene.
To determine whether gap-filling takes place, Holst and Pezdek gave
college students the transcript of a mock mugging in which a witness
testified that the defendant had taken all of those prototypical actions except
one-using force. They then asked the students a week later to recall as
much of the witness testimony as they could. More than 20% of the
students erroneously recalled the witness testifying that the defendant used
315force. Moreover, the unstated action was "apparently so real in their
memory that they were actually significantly more confident deciding that
[the action] had been stated than not.,
316
When Misinformation in Memory Affects Later Inferences, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 1420, 1432 (1994).
313 See Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment, 110
PSYCHOL. BULL. 499, 511 (1991).
314 Hoist & Pezdek, supra note 141, at 580 tbl.3.
315 Id. at 583.
316 Id. at 585.
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Lenton and Bryan reached a similar conclusion in their study of sexual
intent attributions. They presented college students with dating situations
that previous research indicated were prototypic of either an interest in
casual sex or a committed relationship, but omitted certain central features
of those situations. Fifteen minutes later, the students completed a
recognition test in which they attempted to recall what had happened
between the man and the woman. Ninety-eight percent of the participants
made at least one script-consistent error, and 41% made at least four.
317
VIII. DEBIASING PROJECTION AND PROTOTYPING
For all the reasons discussed in the previous Part, neither projection
nor prototyping will consistently lead to accurate mindreading. This is a
depressing conclusion, and one that raises an obvious question: what should
we do about those techniques?
It is clear that we cannot prevent jurors from projection and
prototyping. Jurors project "even when they are asked not to,
318
"regardless of information they have about other individuals," 3' 9 and "even
when they have unambiguous information that their own behavior is
uninformative. 3 2 ° Similarly, jurors not only prototype even when they are
321warned of the dangers of prototyping, jury instructions defining crimes
and defenses have absolutely no impact on the content of their
prototypes. 322 In fact, asking jurors not to prototype will almost certainly
backfire, making the prototypes even more salient 323 and-worse-
increasing the likelihood that the jurors will falsely remember prototype-
consistent evidence.324
317 Alison P. Lenton & Angela Bryan, An Affair to Remember: The Role of Sexual Scripts
in Perceptions of Sexual Intent, 12 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 483, 492 (2005).
318 Clement & Krueger, supra note 72, at 219.
319 Id.
320 Van Boven & Loewenstein, supra note 73, at 59.
321 Smith, supra note 102, at 532 ("[T]his supplementary instruction had no effect on
decision making; subjects relied just as heavily on their prior knowledge of the target
crime.").
322 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 104, at 866 ("These results indicate that hearing the
judge's instructions on the crime definitions did not alter the strategies subjects used to make
their verdict decisions. Typicality still influenced categorization for assault, burglary, and
kidnapping, even when subjects were instructed in the legally correct decision strategy.").
323 See, e.g., Richard M. Wenzlaff & Daniel M. Wegner, Thought Suppression, 2000
ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 59, 61.
324 See, e.g., Maarten J.V. Peters et al., When Stereotypes Backfire: Trying to Suppress
Stereotypes Produces False Recollections of a Crime, 11 LEGAL & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 327, 328
(2006) ("False stereotype-consistent information is especially likely to be reported when
people are instructed to deliberately suppress stereotypes.").
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The best we can hope for, then, is to improve the accuracy of
projection and prototyping. This Part discusses the most promising
debiasing techniques.
A. DEBIASING PROJECTION
Three techniques exist to minimize projection's inherent egocentrism.
First, empathy gaps can be reduced by asking individuals in a cold
emotional state to imagine how they would think and feel in a hot emotional
state before they predict how they would react in a hot state 32 5-the
imagination task apparently makes the individuals realize that they are
likely to underestimate the differences between their hot and cold states,
leading them to take those differences into account when they self-predict.
That is an encouraging finding, because it suggests that asking jurors to
imagine themselves in hot emotional states prior to mindreading may
encourage them to take the defendant's hot emotional state into account
when they simulate his experience of the crime. As Van Boven and
Loewenstein point out, "biased predictions of their own feelings play an
important role in producing biased predictions of others' feelings. 326
A similar technique may help jurors avoid falling prey to the curse of
knowledge-a mindreader's failure to consider the possibility that the target
knows less than he does. Research indicates that the curse can be
minimized by having the mindreader recall a situation in which he was less
knowledgeable than he is now before he determines how much the target
knows.327 The imagination task seems to sensitize the mindreader to the
possibility that he may know more than the target, leading him to more
accurately reconstruct the state of the target's knowledge. It may thus be
useful to have jurors engage in the same kind of imagination task prior to
beginning their deliberations, or even prior to hearing evidence.
Finally, individuals project less egocentrically if they are provided
financial incentives to accurately mindread.328  Adjusting projection
requires effort329 and individuals try to conserve their cognitive resources
whenever possible,33° so individuals who have an incentive to adjust
accurately are more likely to exert the necessary effort than individuals who
325 See Loewenstein et al., supra note 207, at 466.
326 Van Boven & Loewenstein, supra note 73, at 52.
327 See, e.g., Pamela J. Hinds, The Curse of Expertise: The Effects of Expertise and
Debiasing Methods on Predictions of Novice Performance, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.,
Appendix 1999, at 205, 207.
328 See, e.g., Epley et al., supra note 68, at 337.
329 Id. at 332.
330 See Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 308, at 893.
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do not have an incentive.331 We obviously cannot pay jurors to project
accurately, but it may be worthwhile to remind them that inaccurate
mindreading will lead to a wrongful conviction or a false acquittal, both
very costly outcomes. As I have discussed elsewhere, research indicates
that the fear of a wrongful conviction primes jurors to consider alternatives
to the prosecution's account of the defendant's guilt. 332 That same fear, if
made salient, may also motivate jurors to do whatever they can to
sufficiently adjust their simulations of the defendant's experience.
B. DEBIASING PROTOTYPING
Three techniques also exist for debiasing prototyping. First, although
traditional jury instructions have no effect on the content of juror
prototypes, a supplemental instruction that "attack[s jurors']
misconceptions about the target crime on a feature-by-feature basis, giving
them specific information about how to revise the features contained in
their naive representations," leads jurors to prototype far more accurately.333
Smith, for example, presented mock jurors with the following
supplementary kidnapping instruction, which was based on her earlier
analysis of the disjunction between kidnapping prototypes and the legal
definition of the crime:
Many people believe that kidnapping requires a ransom demand. However, a
person can be found guilty of kidnapping even when ransom is not demanded, and
even when the motive for the crime is not money. It is also not necessary that the
victim of the kidnapping be a child. Adults can be victims of kidnapping as well.
When the victim is a child, it is not necessary that the kidnapping result from a
custody battle. A person can be found guilty of kidnapping even when that person is
not involved in a custody battle. It is also not necessary that the victim of the
kidnapping be taken to another location. A person can be found guilty of kidnapping
even if the victim is not taken away ....334
Jurors who heard this instruction "no longer showed an effect of
typicality, with equally high conviction rates for typical and atypical
kidnappings," and more accurately determined when a kidnapping did not
satisfy the legal requirements of the crime.335
Smith's research is extremely encouraging, because there is no reason
jurors could not routinely be given similar supplemental instructions. There
is, however, one difficulty worth mentioning: to maximize the debiasing
effect of a supplemental instruction, a judge would have to determine not
331 See Epley et al., supra note 68, at 332.
332 See Heller, supra note 277, at 281-82.
333 Smith, supra note 102, at 533.
311 Id. at 529-30.
331 Id. at 533.
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only how the features of juror prototypes typically deviate from the formal
legal elements of a crime or defense, but also-and far more importantly-
how the prototypes actually held by the jurors in the case deviate from
those elements. As we have seen, prototypes differ greatly between
individuals. A general supplemental instruction would thus risk failing to
revise the prototype features that are the most in need of revision.
The second and third debiasing techniques both concern
personological prototypes: stereotypes of the "typical" battered woman or
"typical" auto thief. Such stereotypes are particularly difficult to alter,336
because they are "are deep seated, resistant to external pressures and
strategic processes, and stable across time and situation. 337 Nevertheless,
two techniques have successfully moderated their influence on social
perception. First, individuals can be asked to imagine someone who does
not fit their stereotype. Studies have shown that a "consider the opposite"
imagination task significantly reduces an individual's stereotype
338expectancies when he later mindreads a specific target. Second,
individuals can be asked to take the target's perspective prior to
mindreading. Research indicates that such perspective taking "increase[s]
the expression of positive evaluations of the target, reduce[s] the expression
of stereotypic content, and prevent[s] the hyperaccessibility of the
stereotype construct. 339
Both techniques could be utilized in the legal context. Voir dire could
be structured to determine whether jurors possess inaccurate stereotypes
(person-prototypes) of the defendant. If they do, they could be then asked
to either engage in counterstereotype imagery or imagine how they would
think and feel if they were the defendant before being sent to the jury room
to deliberate. Either technique would reduce the likelihood-perhaps
significantly-that the jurors would permit their stereotypes to undermine
the accuracy of their mindreading.
The second technique, of course, essentially involves encouraging
jurors to mindread through projection instead of prototyping. That is
clearly a viable strategy when inaccurate person-prototyping seems
336 See Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit
Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 829 (2001).
337 Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 243 (2002).
338 See id. at 249 (reviewing studies). It also reduces the likelihood that the individual
will produce stereotype-consistent false memories-another salutary effect. See Lenton &
Bryan, supra note 317, at 485.
339 Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing
Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 708, 720 (2000).
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particularly likely in a case-one in which the defendant is charged with a
racially congruent crime, for example. In such situations, projection may be
a better option than mindreading.
IX. CONCLUSION
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea-"the act does not make a
person guilty unless the mind is also guilty." Such a simple maxim, yet one
so difficult to apply. Aquinas did not believe that ordinary mortals could
determine whether an individual possessed a guilty mind; to him, "God
alone, the framer of the divine law, is able to judge the inward movement of
wills .... ." Legal scholars, by contrast, have always dismissed Aquinas's
skepticism, insisting-even taking as an article of faith-that jurors can, in
fact, determine the mens rea of those whom the criminal law seeks to
punish.
This Article has attempted to take that debate seriously, not to resolve
it. The traditional explanation of mindreading is clearly inadequate: jurors
mindread through projection and prototyping, not through functionalist
theorizing. But that does not mean that Aquinas is correct and jurors are
incapable of accurate mindreading. Accurate mindreading is sometimes
possible: namely, when a juror uses projection to determine the mental state
of a defendant who is very similar to himself or applies a legally precise
prototype to determine the mental state of a defendant who is very
different.340 It is also possible, given the necessary will, to improve the
accuracy of both mindreading techniques. Whether they can be made
accurate enough to justify the vast cognitive demands contemporary
criminal law imposes on jurors, however, very much remains to be seen.
340 See, e.g., Ames & Iyengar, supra note 163, at 281 ("Good judges may be typical
population members who recognize their similarity and project as a result, or atypical
population members who recognize their dissimilarity and, accordingly, curb their
projection.").
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